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1.  Introduction 
 
In the early 1990s, the Colombian government launched an economic liberalization program 
through the promotion of market competition and institutional deregulation. The economic 
openness package included major structural reforms encompassing: i) foreign trade policy, ii) the 
exchange rate regime, iii) capital flow controls, iv) central bank independence, v) privatization, 
vi) labor legislation, vii) foreign investment legislation and vii) social security and pension 
regimes.
1  
Historically, the size of the state in Colombia has been below the average of other Latin 
American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. However, revenues from 
privatization have had an important impact on the government’s short-run fiscal policy, since 
from 1994 to 1998 the majority of investment in social programs was financed with these 
resources. During the 1993–1998 period, the privatization program in the productive sector was 
dominated by the sale of assets in the power, natural gas transportation, manufacturing, and, to a 
lesser degree, the water and sewage sectors. Regarding telecommunications, reforms have 
induced new private investment as opposed to changes in ownership.  
  Colombia’s most important institutional and regulatory reform during the 1990s took 
place in the domiciliary public services sector, where free entry was granted for private sector 
providers. This implied the setup of modern and independent regulatory commissions for 
electricity and natural gas, water and sanitation, and telecommunications. Hence, economic 
deregulation in Colombia was part of a comprehensive long-term strategy to promote new roles 
for the public and private sectors. However, a decade later, economic liberalization has not been 
well-documented or analyzed on sectoral bases.
2  
There are some exceptions, however, including the papers of Zuleta et al. (1993) and 
Montenegro (1994, 1995) on the privatization process. These papers document in a preliminary 
manner the motivations that induced the government to rely on privatization as an economic 
                                                      
1The general objectives and the scope of the economic openness program are in the 1990−1994 Development Plan 
(DNP, 1991a). The main institutional reforms are embodied in the following laws and CONPES (National Council 
for Economic and Social Policy) documents: i) foreign control regime (Law 9/1991), ii) foreign trade reform (Law 
7/1991), iii) financial reform (Law 45/1990), iv) new statute of foreign investment (CONPES document - January 
22/1991), v) labor reform (Law 50/1990), and vi) privatization of maritime ports (Law 1/1991). See DNP (1991b).     
2 One example is the study by Spiller and Guash (1998) on the regulatory process in Latin America, in which they 
skip over the Colombian experience despite that country’s advances in public utilities regulation. Furthermore, in the 
collective studies of privatization in Latin America such as those by Glade (1996), Baer and Conroy (1994), and 
Baer and Birch (1994), one finds that reference to Colombia is usually limited in contrast to other Latin American 
countries.  
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instrument for promoting market competition, but they do not provide any empirical analysis of 
ex-post efficiency performance. Regarding the regulatory reform in network industries, there are 
the papers of Gutierrez and Berg (1999) on telecommunications and Pombo (2001b) on electric 
utilities. These sectoral-based studies document the regulatory reforms and present the evolution 
of some indicators that provide a partial evaluation of such reforms. Thus, the documentation of 
Colombia’s privatization programs and regulatory reforms during the 1990s is still incomplete 
and requires empirical evidence to gauge the success of the design and implementation of those 
economic policies.  
This paper seeks to fill that gap by providing an ex-post performance analysis of the 
privatization programs based on a representative sample with emphasis on manufacturing and 
power plants, following the benchmark approach of Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994) 
and La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999). The objective of the study is therefore two-fold. First 
it seeks to measure the changes in performance indicators with an emphasis on a sample of 
manufacturing and power firms that underwent privatization, were restructured because of new 
regulations, or started operations under the new regulatory environment.  Second, the paper aims 
to model technical efficiency and profitability variables controlling by industry and plant 
characteristics, ownership type and regulatory variables in order to evaluate the effect of 
privatization on plant performance.  
The rest of the paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 analyzes privatization efforts 
within the context of overall deregulation, private investment involvement in public 
infrastructure, and the promotion of free market policies. Section 3 examines the privatization 
programs by economic sector. It begins by analyzing the divestiture program of former Instituto 
de Fomento Industrial (IFI) enterprises from 1986 to 1997 and then continues with a brief 
summary of the state oil company (ECOPETROL) divestiture program, which affected the 
natural gas and regional gasoline distributing companies. The section ends with an analysis of the 
regulatory reform of Colombia’s power sector, which was greatly impacted by privatization. 
Section 4 presents the core results of the paper. It evaluates the null hypothesis of structural 
changes in indicator mean and median regarding firm profitability, efficiency, investment, 
payroll size, and sales. The analysis carried out takes into account industry-adjusted indicators by 
specific control group for the newly privatized firms in manufacturing and power utilities. It also 
looks at thermal power generation as a measure of technical efficiency—based on the notion of 
best practice production frontier—before and after the 1994 regulatory reform in the power 
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sector. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence of firms’ efficiency and profitability indicators, 
controlling for plant characteristics, industry-specific variables, ownership structure, and 
regulatory policy-related variables. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2.  The Deregulation and Privatization Program in Colombia: An Overview 
 
Privatization in Colombia was originally approached as a tool for economic deregulation and 
promotion of market competition. The objective of the privatization program that was designed 
during the 1990s was to create incentives for and redirect private investment in public 
infrastructure and network industries. This was to be achieved through: i) concession contracts, 
ii) sales contracts, and iii) sectoral regulatory reforms.  
Concession contracts are an instrument for promoting the involvement of private 
investment in public works and domiciliary services. Concessions had been virtually abolished in 
practice since 1930 when nationalization and direct government involvement in the market 
economy became more prevalent. Prior to that, concessions had been widely used during the 19
th 
century in railroads, mining, and crude oil exploitation. The economic deregulation policy of the 
1990s restored concessions as a favored instrument for enhancing investment in strategic sectors 
such as railroads, ports, airports, and highways. In 1991 the Constitution was reformed to 
introduce new rules for property rights regarding domiciliary public services and the 
development of public infrastructure, creating a legal basis for implementing concessions. The 
new legislation focused on the government’s regulatory role and gave it a mandate to set up a 
flexible legal framework regarding public contracting and concession regimes (Law 80 of 1993). 
One of the main objectives of the law was to introduce equal treatment into the awarding of state 
contracts to private and public firms, as well as to extend the length of contracts. Specifically, the 
law allows the signing of contracts of more than 20 years in duration. At roughly the same time, 
the 1990 Government Development Plan was addressing the new economic agenda: economic 
deregulation, trade liberalization, and sectoral regulatory reforms. Afterwards, a series of 
documents from the National Council for Economic and Social Policy, CONPES, (Concejo 
Nacional de Política Económica y Social), as well as the laws governing domiciliary public 
services, electric power, telecommunication, and privatization, set forth specific rules and 
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guidelines regarding private investment participation, the upcoming privatizations and the 
regulatory reform of network industries.
3 
Concession-type contracts were used in public works infrastructure projects such as 
maritime ports, road construction and maintenance, airports, aqueducts and sewers, railroads and 
mobile phone networks. The recent studies of Alonso et al. (2001) and Bonilla et al. (2000) 
document the most important concession contracts by economic sector in Colombia. The former 
focuses on the contracts’ characteristics and incentive mechanisms, providing a preliminary 
assessment. The latter analyzes the evolution of domiciliary public services and transportation 
infrastructure provision in the largest cities of Colombia’s Atlantic coast region. The importance 
of the latter study is that concessions have been more active in those cities, where a history of 
poor local governance translated into low-quality domiciliary public services provision for 
decades before market entry deregulation.  
According to the results of those studies and several follow-up CONPES documents, one 
can conclude that concessions have had a narrow scope in their implementation. By 1998 there 
were 35 concession contracts signed.
4 Out of 1,400 municipal and rural aqueducts within the 
country there were only 4 contracts at water companies and only 3 contracts at airports out of a 
possible 20. In telecommunications there have only been concessions in mobile telephony. With 
respect to local phone companies, they have implemented joint-venture contracts with private 
investors for network expansion. The same applies to the public long distance carrier, 
TELECOM. Railroad concessions have been limited to cargo transportation, mainly to one 
operating concessionaire in coal transportation. In fact, in 1998 the rail network in operation was 
only 50% the size of the national network in 1970.
5 Despite the above, concessions have been 
important in promoting private investment in road maintenance, maritime ports and the 
construction of new gas pipelines. 
                                                      
3 The CONPES documents are: 2648 (DNP, 1993b); 2775 (DNP, 1995); and 2929 (DNP, 1997c). Law 37 of 1993 
deals with concessions contracts for telecommunications, Law 142 of 1994 the public housing services reform; Law 
143 of 1994 the power sector reform; and Law 226 of 1995 specifies that all privatization sales must give an initial 
offer to the “solidarity” sector, which includes the former company’s labor union, worker associations and 
cooperative firms.   
4 Appendix 1 lists the concession contracts by industry. 
5 For details, see Alonso et al. (2001), and CONPES documents 2648 (DNP, 1993b), 2775 (DNP, 1995), 2928 (DNP, 
1997b), and 2929 (DNP, 1997c). The first concession regarding airports was the construction and maintenance of the 
second runway at Bogotá international airport. Regarding the railroad network, there were 3,468 km in operation in 
1970 while in 1997 there were just 1,852 km. The volume of cargo transportation via railroads has risen since 1995 
because of the coal exports by Drummond.  
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Concessions were not the only facet of the privatization program. In addition to such 
agreements to contract out certain services, the privatization program involved the outright sale 
by local, regional or national public institutions of equity shares in several enterprises in the 
manufacturing, network utilities, natural gas distribution and banking industries.  The schedule 
for public divestiture of public and mixed-capital enterprises and public financial institutions was 
laid out in CONPES documents 2378 (DNP, 1988) and 2648 (DNP, 1993b). Table 1 displays a 
complete list of the number of privatization contracts that took place in the productive sector 
from 1986-1998.  
 
Table 1. Privatization Program in the Productive Sector in Colombia 1986-1998 
Industry Number  of 
Contracts 






Manufacturing 27  Yes      288.1 
    Consumer Goods  8  Yes      7.3 
    Intermediate Goods
1 12  Yes      220.8 
    Capital Goods  7  Yes      60.0 
Mining
2 4  Yes      3.5 
Natural Gas
3  2  Yes   205.5 
Gasoline  Distribution  5  Yes  41.2 
Fishing 1  Yes      1.5 
Services 6  Yes      6.9 
Power Sector  12      Yes  5,060.0 
Water and Sanitation  1      Yes  2.9 
TOTAL  58      5,609.6 
Notes: MCE = Mixed-capital enterprise; ROE = Regionally owned enterprise; MOE = Municipally owned 
enterprise.   
1: Includes Cerromatoso.  
2: Mining: Carbocol is excluded since the sale was made in March 2001.   
3: Refers to the sale of Gas Natural S.A and Promigas S.A.   
Natural Gas Transportation and Distribution: Gas Natural + Promigas. Gasoline Distribution: Terpel 
companies = Terpel Sabana + Terpel B/manga + Terpel Centro+ Terpel Sur + Terpel Norte 
Power Sector: 1996-1997 Privatization: Betania + Chivor + Tasajero + TermoCartagena + EPSA + EEB 
Corelca Privatization: EAtlantico + EBolivar + ESucre+ ECordoba + EMagdalena + ECesar  
TEBSA: Overhaul did not imply a sale 
Water and Sanitation: Cartagena Aqueduct became ACUACAR, a mixed-capital utility. Partners = City of 
Cartagena (50%) + Aguas de Barcelona (45%) + private investors (5%). Total utility capitalization = US$4.84M 
Sources: ECOPETROL, requested files; IFI, requested files; Dager (1999), DNP (1993b, 1997b, 1997c), Bonilla 
et al. (2001), Alonso et al. (2001), Pombo (2001b). 
 
One can conclude that privatization in Colombia, in contrast to the experiences of other 
Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, was not a comprehensive 
process. There are two reasons for this. First, privatization, rather than a centerpiece of policy, 
was designed as a complementary policy instrument to economic deregulation. In that sense, the 
role of the public sector was mainly redirected toward implementing new regulatory schemes, 
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and privatization was intended to either channel new investments in public infrastructure or ease 
industrial restructuring processes. Second, aside from the public utilities there were not too many 
commercial and industrial establishments for sale, given the modest size of the state in Colombia 
(historically one of the smallest in the region). Thus, privatization contracts were generally 
limited to the sale of equity shares of mixed-capital enterprises in manufacturing, gas and 
gasoline distribution, and to a lesser degree in services and mining, according to data up to 1998.  
Privatization of network industries arose as one instrument for promoting market 
competition. It came as part of ongoing sectoral regulatory reforms aimed at enhancing industry 
efficiency, channeling private investment, and deregulating market entry especially in the 
provision of domiciliary public services. The power sector has been the leading sector by far in 
accumulated privatization sales (90%) according to Table 1, followed by sales in manufacturing 
(5.1%) and natural gas transportation and distribution (3.6%).  The following sections focus on 
the privatization programs in the manufacturing, gas and power sectors respectively.  
 
3.  Privatization by Sectors 
 
3.1.  Privatization in Manufacturing 
 
The privatization program in manufacturing was centered around the sale by the Instituto de 
Fomento Industrial (IFI) of shares from its investment portfolio in a group of manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing enterprises. This financial institution was founded by Decree-Law 1157 of 
1940 and became a strategic tool for state promotion of industrialization. The IFI’s main 
objectives are to provide long-term credit to private enterprises and to advance risk capital to 
industrial investment projects. Typically, the IFI’s resources come from domestic saving through 
the issue of certificates of deposit and long-term bonds. In the international market, the IFI 
leverages loans from multilateral agencies and commercial banks.   
  The role of the IFI in creating new manufacturing enterprises located in late industries was 
central during the 1950s and 1960s. Today’s largest private capital enterprises in the steel, 
chemical, paper, fertilizer, metalworking, and automobile sectors are former IFI-associated 
companies. The IFI’s larger projects were oriented to capital-intensive industries and producers 
of intermediate materials as an integral part of Colombia’s import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) policy, which sought to generate a new supply of manufactured goods for the domestic 
market.  The IFI firms to a large extent drove Colombia’s industrialization process during the 
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postwar years. The IFI’s primary objective according to the its founding statutes is to “promote 
enterprises dedicated to the transformation of domestic raw materials given that private capital is 
not able to develop by itself” (Decree-Law 1157, 1940). Thus, the formation of mixed-capital 
enterprises channeled private sector investments into new activities. It also guaranteed a degree 
of stability in foreign investment participation. The IFI’s founding statutes are specific in 
ordering the sale of equity shares once the government considers the new enterprises to be 
established in their respective markets. The IFI thereby rotates its capital to promote new 
industrial projects, and exercises the role of supporter rather than that of a permanent investor. It 
played an active role as financial supporter within the context of ISI until the mid-1970s when 
several industrial projects began operations. As a result, manufacturing firms such as Acerías Paz 
del Río, Cementos Boyacá, Colclinker, Compañía Colombiana Automotriz, Icollantas, 
Monomeros Colombo-Venezolanos, Propal, and Sofasa, among others, have been leading firms 
at the core of Colombia’s entrepreneurial development. Hence, in the case of the IFI, 
privatization has traditionally been a financial instrument used by the Colombian government. 
The role of the IFI, however, made for a different type of privatization than that carried out in 
other Latin countries, as most firms the Colombian case were mixed-capital enterprises rather 
than state-owned enterprises. 
CONPES document 2378 (DNP, 1988) set forth an accelerated timetable for the 
privatization of IFI enterprises. In so doing, the policy placed more emphasis on the transfer of 
assets than on the IFI’s new investments. In December of 1987, the IFI had capital shares in 45 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises. Thirty of them were in operation and the 
others had already begun a liquidation process. In addition, there were investments in 6 ongoing 
projects.
6   
The privatization program involved three steps: i) the selection criteria, ii) the stock 
assessment, and iii) the method of sale. The selection criteria singled out for sale of equity shares 
all those operating enterprises that were not subject to special legal procedures as well as ongoing 
projects that had not started business operations within 3 years of initial disbursements.
7 The 
                                                      
6 It is important to highlight that there were important transfers of assets to the private sector before the privatization 
program of the 1990s. One example was Icollantas in which the IFI sold its equity shares in 1980 and 1985. In 1994 
the IFI participated in a 20% share of the company’s capitalization of US$60 million.  
7 “Special legal procedures” refers to the following cases: i) companies with property shares from two or more public 
institutions, ii) companies with direct investments from foreign government agencies, and iii) companies with 
ongoing settlement processes with their lenders. The second case applied at that time to Monomeros because the 
Venezuelan government remained a shareholder. For details, see DNP (1988). 
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stock assessment process sought to determine the value of the firms’ net assets and the stock 
price. The assessment studies took into account several parameters such as the present value of 
company cash flows, asset benchmarking, asset book values, stock exchange prices, and 
reposition and liquidation costs. In addition, all stocks were listed on the domestic stock 
exchange markets as well as at the National Stock Registry Office to lend transparency to the 
process. This measure facilitated the purchase of public equities and contributed to property 
democratization. Regarding the method of sale, the IFI used several bidding procedures such as 
private offers to current shareholders, public bids, the domestic stock exchange, and preferential 
offers to the so-called “solidarity” sector, which is formed mainly by companies’ retired 
employees and union workers.  
From May 1986 to December 1997 there were 38 privatizations affecting IFI enterprises. 
Table 2 summarizes the IFI’s sale program. Three aspects merit further comment. First, in all 
cases the shares held by the IFI accounted for less than one half of the firm’s net worth. This 
implied that the IFI never set management policies. Moreover, the IFI partnerships have been 
oriented since the beginning toward promoting technology transfers and to fostering 
entrepreneurship. Second, the data suggest that the sales process was successful in the sense that 
stock prices were in all cases greater or equal to the pre-privatization nominal stock price.   
However, there is no evidence to ascertain if fixed assets were correctly valued before 
privatization. Third, the accumulated sales figure was US$300 million, which reflects the modest 
government involvement in manufacturing by the end of the 1980s. To put it in perspective, that 
amount represents less than 10% of the privatized value of Colombia’s power sector during 
1996–1997, or the sale price of the Mexican telecom company TELMEX in 1990.   
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Table 2.  IFI - Privatization Program 1986-1997 
 
Sector Firm Date Number IFI Stock Stock Total Total Sale
of Share Nominal Sale Sale Sale Method
Shares % Value $ Value $ US$M US$M
Fishing COPESCOL Jul-91 147,000 49.0% 1,000 6,505 956.2 1.5 Public Bid
Manuf EMPACA S.A. May-86 357,440 29.2% 10 150 53.6 0.3 Public Bid
Manuf SUCROMILES S.A. May-86 102,709 15.6% 100 2,400 246.5 1.3 Public Bid
Manuf VIKINGOS S.A. Jul-86 7,049,250 35.5% 10 16 112.8 0.6 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf UNICA S.A. Mar-88 1,108,273 3.4% 10 95 105.3 0.4 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf FORJASCOL S.A.            Dec-88 ASSETS 1,699.8 5.7 Public Offer
Manuf SOFASA Feb-89 1,085,648 49.8% 1,000 18,362 19,935.0 52.1 Public Offer
Manuf CICOLSA Mar-90 140,000 17.4% 100 100 14.0 0.0 Private Offer
Manuf AICSA S.A.            Apr-90 1,321,920 49.0% 10 144 190.5 0.4 Public Offer
Manuf ING RISARALDA S.A.  Jul-90 2,307,868 11.7% 100 421 972.4 1.9 Public Offer
Manuf PAPELCOL S.A. Aug-90 ASSETS 16,218.2 32.3 Public Offer
Manuf COLCLINKER S.A.        Oct-90 118,107 15.7% 1,000 16,160 1,908.6 3.8 Private Offer
Manuf RIOCLARO S.A. Dec-90 5,081,585 10.3% 100 430 2,185.1 4.4 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf C.C.A. Dec-90 505,055 0.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 Private Offer
Manuf COSEDA Jun-91 200,000 20.0% 1,000 1,277 255.3 0.4 Private Offer
Manuf ASTIVAR Aug-91 46,500 31.0% 100 2,800 130.2 0.2 Private Offer
Manuf TEXPINAL              Sep-91 22,089,534 32.4% 5 160 3,534.3 5.6 Private Offer
Manuf PROVICA Sep-91 47,160 13.2% 1,000 1,414 66.7 0.1 Private Offer
Manuf CONASTIL Jan-92 1,013,828 59.9% 1,000 1,000 1,013.8 1.5 Private Offer
Manuf FERTICOL Apr-92 129,028 0.7% 10 10 1.3 0.0 Preferential Offer
Manuf PENNWALT Nov-92 7,739,517 40.7% 10 158 1,222.8 1.8 Private Offer
Manuf FATEXTOL Feb-93 240,001 16.0% 1,000 2,250 540.0 0.8 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf FRIGOPESCA Dec-94 5,708,109 47.4% 100 440 2,511.6 3.2 Public Bid
Manuf INTELSA Apr-95 7,853 15.7% 1,500 16,500 129.6 0.2 Public Offer
Manuf COSECHAR Oct-95 11,954 1.4% 500 695 8.3 0.0 Public Offer
Manuf QUIBI S.A. Apr-96 12,847,611 20.7% 10 45 578.1 0.6 Public Offer
Manuf CERRO MATOSO Feb-97 5,512,803 47.7% 100 28,264 155,813.9 150.3 Pref Offer/Public Bid
Manuf NITROVEN  Dec-97 30,000 10.3% 1,000 702,933 21,088.0 20.3 Pref Offer/Public Bid
Mining FOSFONORTE S.A. Jan-89 691 1.1% 1,000 1,250 0.9 0.0 Private Offer
Mining FOSFOBOYACA S.A. Feb-90 9,000 6.4% 1,000 1,000 9.0 0.0 Private Offer
Mining PROCARBON Sep-91 35,160 0.1% 100 270 9.5 0.0 Domestic Stock Market
Mining PRODESAL Oct-91 2,351,174 11.6% 100 921 2,164.4 3.5 Domestic Stock Market
Services PROHOTELES S.A. May-86 1,105,201 10.8% 10 39 43.1 0.2 Domestic Stock Market
Services CIAC S.A. Mar-89 103,709 0.5% 10 38 3.9 0.0 Private Offer
Services COLAR LTDA. Aug-89 ASSETS 100.0 0.3 Public Offer
Services CORFERIAS S.A. Oct-89 4,239,005 5.6% 10 65 275.5 0.7 Private Offer
Services CORFIDESARROLLO Sep-93 15,183,107 16.1% 100 217 3,294.7 4.8 Domestic Stock Market
Services COKOSILK S.A. Jan-97 1,269,546 16.2% 690 690 876.0 0.8 Pref Offer/Public Bid
Manufacturing 23.8% 230,536 288
Mining 4.8% 2,184 3
Services 9.8% 4,593 7
Fishing 49.0% 956 2
TOTAL  20.3% 300  
Source: IFI, requested files; Dager (1999)            
Notes: After 1995 all privatization contracts were subject to Law 226 of 1995        
CCA: Equity shares seized by Banco Colombia’s trust fund in 1986         
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3.2.  Privatization of Natural Gas and Gasoline Distribution 
 
The privatization efforts in the natural gas transportation and distribution industry as well as 
gasoline distribution were centered around the sale by the Colombian petroleum company, 
ECOPETROL,
8 of equity shares from its investment portfolio. Privatization was restricted to the 
sale of those assets that were not directly related with crude oil exploration, transportation, and 
refining. ECOPETROL’s main investments were located in complementary industries such as 
natural gas transportation and distribution, gasoline stations, pipelines, thermal gas-based power 
plants, and other investments in non-oil businesses.
9 Table 3 depicts a summary of the 
ECOPETROL divestiture process up until mid-1999. 
Again three comments are worth making. First, the share of ECOPETROL in the privatized 
companies was, except for Gas Natural, less than 50% on the privatization date. Therefore, as in 
the case of the IFI enterprises, firms were not directly subordinated to ECOPETROL guidelines 
and management policies. Moreover, those companies were independent in their investment 
expansion plans, and company wage policy was set independently from ECOPETROL.
10  
Second, privatization until mid-1999 consisted of three sales. The most important was Gas 
Natural in May 1997 in which the second bid by the strategic private investors was successful. 
The sale price was three times greater than the base price. The bid followed a simultaneous first 
price auction on the country’s three stock markets.
11 Third, the gasoline network represented by 
the TERPEL stations was the first privatization sale after CONPES document 2648 of 1993 was 
approved. TERPEL was traditionally the competitor of private retailers. Thus, this transfer 
implied that gasoline retail distribution became a 100% privately owned but regulated industry, 
in contrast to other oil producers in Latin American countries such as Ecuador, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, where gasoline distribution remains vertically integrated with the state oil company.  
 
                                                      
8 Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos.  
9 For instance, by March 1993 ECOPETROL had equity shares in three domestic investment banks (Corficaldas, 
Corfinorte, Corfinanza), one power utility (ESSA), one fertilizer plant (FERTICOL), and one promoting enterprise 
(Artesanias de Colombia). For details, see DNP (1993b).   
10 ECOPETROL’s labor union has historically been one of the most influential and politically strongest in the 
country. 
11 For details see ECOPETROL’s press release of June 6, 1997. According to that bulletin there was tight 
competition among the winner (Gas Natural of Spain) and British Petroleum, Amoco, Empresas Publicas de 
Medellín (EPM), and France Gas.   
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Table 3. ECOPETROL Privatization Program by June 1999 
 
Company/Name Activity Share Assess. Number Sale Sale Priv. Sale
Before Price Stocks Price Price Date Method
Priv $US Sold Solid. Private
%$ U S $ U S
Gas Companies
Gas Natural Transp. 60.6 5.85 9,088,711 5.85 17.46 1997 Pref-Offer
Distrib. Stock Market
Colgas Distrib. 16.2 0.08 12,267,411 0.08 Ongoing Pref-Offer
Sale Stock Market
Promigas Transp. 28.8 2.46 16,954,441 2.46 2.95 1997 Pref-Offer
Stock Market
Invercolsa Distrib. 24.8 0.06 0.06 Ongoing Pref-Offer
Sale Stock Market
Surtigas Distrib. 15.4 0.22 No sale




Terpel Sabana Distrib. 40.0 640,000 8.34 1993 Direct Offer
Terpel B/manga S.A. Distrib. 36.1 1,882,322 9.78 1993 Stock Market
Terpel Centro S.A. Distrib. 49.7 46,993,690 0.28 1993 Stock Market
Terpel Sur S.A. Distrib. 45.6 262,290 8.27 1993 Stock Market
Terpel Norte S.A. Distrib. 18.0 2,290,105 0.90 1993 Stock Market
Subtotal 27.57  
Notes: After 1995 all privatizations were subject to Law 226; ECOPETROL stopped the sale of Iversolsa in 2000. 
Colgas had not been sold as of 2001. 
Sources: ECOPETROL Planning Office, requested files; Decree 829 of 1999; DNP (1993b, 1997b, 1997c). 
 
 
3.3.  Industry Restructuring and Privatization in the Power Sector 
 
Regulatory reform in Colombia’s electricity supply industry (ESI) is supported by the Electric 
Law (Law 143) and by the Domiciliary Public Services Law (Law 142) of July 1994.  This 
reform has been the most important and comprehensive since 1967 when the national grid 
company, Interconexión Eléctrica S.A (ISA), was established. The reform changed the structure 
of the vertically integrated industry. The new regulatory institutions started to operate one year 
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later. The reform’s core elements followed the schemes adopted in Great Britain concerning the 
separation of power activities and markets, the setting up of an electricity spot market or pool, 
and the development of a long-term contract market for electricity.
12 Law 143 created the 
Regulatory Commission for Energy and Gas (Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas, or 
CREG) and rules regarding: i) the sector’s planning and expansion plans, ii) the regulatory 
scheme, iii) power generation, iv) transmission and grid operation, v) grid access fees, vi) the 
rate-setting regime for electricity sales, vii) concession contracts, and vii) environmental issues.  
The power sector reform sought to introduce new competition and set up an independent 
regulatory system. In that sense, the main purpose was to set the basis for the expansion and 
diversification of power generation sources, improving both the sector’s efficiency and its 
reliability.  Political willingness to support this plan was greatest by 1992 because the country 
was in the middle of a generalized power shortage and electricity rationing schedules were 
imposed. The generating system had to be made less vulnerable to abnormal hydrological 
conditions (i.e., El Niño) and more reliant on thermal generation from either coal or natural gas.  
Diagram 1 synthesizes the post-reform power market structure. First, the split among 
power activities implied the divestiture of the main power holdings that were vertically integrated 
monopolies. The same happened with the national grid company, which had to sell all of its 
power generating units in 1995. The new regulatory framework seeks to promote market entry 
and competition among generators. They compete openly by sending their bids one day ahead to 
the pool. The sale price is based on an hour of use and it distinguishes between peak and off-peak 
hours. The National Dispatch Center, which is located at ISA’s headquarters, combines 
information regarding the system’s constraints, such as hydrological factors, reservoir levels, and 
transmission bottlenecks, with final commercial demand in order to determine the dispatch 
                                                      
12 The national grid company Interconexión Eléctrica S.A (ISA) was founded in 1967. By that time, the sectoral 
development view was to consolidate ISA as the largest nationwide power generator and transporter of bulk 
electricity following the vertically integrated natural monopoly model. For more details, see World Bank (1991). A 
complete description of the regulatory reform in Colombia’s power sector is in Pombo (2001b) and ISA reports. 
Historically, Colombia’s power sector has been divided in five regional markets: Bogotá Power Company (EEB); the 
Atlantic Coast Regional Electric Corporation (CORELCA), Public Enterprises of Medellín (EPM), Public 
Enterprises of Cali and the Cauca Valley Corporation (EMCALI and CVC), and the Colombian Power Institute 
(ICEL). So far, only two out of the five power distribution networks have been privatized. Nevertheless, one has to 
keep in mind that the city of Bogotá is still the largest shareholder of CODENSA, the power distribution utility 
founded after the EEB divestiture. Therefore, EPM, EMCALI, and ICEL still, as public utilities, cover 70% of the 
geographical areas that belong to the National Interconnected System. Hence, privatization and entry competition 
remain a pending and unfinished task for local power distribution.   
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orders. Thus, the market price that the pool
13 sets is the highest marginal bid that clears the 
market each hour. Based on the above, the pool administrator runs the next-day merit order 
dispatches.
14 Financial transactions take place by direct purchases from the pool or through 
contracts signed directly between generators and final users. However, the pool administrator 
runs the invoicing generated by all financial agreements. That is, that office pays and collects 
bills derived from contracts.  
 
Diagram 1. The Power Market Structure 
 
DISTRIBUTORS + POWER 
WHOLESALE RETAILERS 
- Buying and selling of electricity 
- Competition + Entry (Gradual) 













National Dispatch Center 
 
 
Pool Administration  
TRANSMISSION   
 





•  Entry + Competition. 
•  Free prices 
•  Short-run supply competition 
Distributor costs passthrough to 
clients  
Source: ISA report 1998. 
 
                                                      
13 The pool is locally known as the Mercado de Energía Mayorista (MEM). 
14 The power market in Colombia parallels the British pool of the early 1990s. For more details on electricity 
markets and the British experience see the work of Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) and Newbery (2000). For 
Latin America good reviews are found in Spiller and Guash (1998), and the IDB 2001 annual report.  
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Regarding power transmission, new regulation treats that activity as a natural monopoly. 
The reform consolidated ISA as the country’s power transporter. In this sense, the regulator 
determines prices and guarantees access to the grid to all providers. This company is not allowed 
to have an equity share in either power generating or distributing companies. Power distributors 
as domiciliary public service providers face two types of regulation. The first one is price 
regulation. CREG currently sets the markup formula for distributors as well as the determining 
the nature of passthrough to final users. With respect to the latter, CREG determines: i) direct 
purchase costs such as the pool sale price and transportation charges, ii) capacity charges, and iii) 
costs of the reserve provisions to stabilize the system and prevent bottlenecks in the transmission 
system.
15 Price regulation at this stage differs from most systems that have moved toward 
electricity markets that have adopted price-cap rules. The second type of regulation concerns 
quality control, whereby companies are subject to sanctions if their service fails to meet 
minimum quality standards. The reform was designed to impact two types of final users. 
Residential users are mainly regulated consumers. Final prices for them are set by the markup 
formula, which includes past inflation. The non-regulated users or large clients are mainly 
commercial and industrial users. A large client might enter into a purchase agreement contract 
with a power distributor, wholesale retailer or generator. This implies that these large consumers 
can hedge against pool price volatility, a sensitive variable especially in hydro-based systems.  
The reforms and regulations led power holdings to undertake a generalized divestiture 
process across electricity holdings in order to fully separate power generation, transmission, 
distribution, and the setting up of new commercialization activities. Thus, privatization arose as 
one instrument for promoting market competition and industry restructuring, and it became a 
complementary policy within a broad deregulatory context. Table 4 describes the sales process, 
which had two phases up until 1998. The first one was the 1996–1997 privatization round, which 
focused on the sale of thermal plants and hydroelectric stations. Sales reached US$3.9 billion. 
This represented a 50% transfer of overall system generating capacity. The most important 
transaction was the sale of 48% of the Bogotá Power Company’s net worth, which also included 
the transfer of the local distribution network and the regional grid. The buyers were two holding 
companies owned by ENDESA and CHILECTRA, Chile’s largest power generators.  
                                                      
15 The last component is the analog for the Uplift component in Great Britain. For details on the Colombian and 
British formulas see Pombo (2001b).  
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The second phase of the privatization program took place in 1998 and focused on the 
capitalization and sale of the CORELCA holding, which covered Colombia’s northern Atlantic 
region. The restructuring involved splitting the holding into several independent companies 
according to power activity: generation, transmission and distribution. The national grid 
company ISA bought 65% of the new transmission company’s equity share. On the other hand, a 
holding company formed by American and Venezuelan utilities purchased a 65% equity share of 
the two distribution utilities founded after CORELCA’s restructuring. Both transactions added up 
US$1.16 billion.  
 
Table 4. Privatization in the Power Sector: 1995−1998 
 
Utility/Plant/Hydro Capacity Type Transaction Seller Buyer Net Worth Investor
MW US$M Share (%) Origin
Betania 500 Hydro 497 ICEL ENDESA 100 Chile
Chivor 1,000 Hydro 645 ISA CHILGENER 100 Chile
Tasajero 150 Thermal-Coal 30 ICEL Cooperative - Sector 58 Colombia
TermoCartagena 180 Thermal-Coal 15 Corelca Electricidad-Caracas 15 Venezuela
Cooperative - Sector 85 Colombia
EPSA-Gen 772 Hydro 535 CVC Houston  Industries/ 56 United States
210 Thermal-Gas
EPSA-Distrib Electricidad-Caracas Venezuela
EEB-Gen 2,312 Hydro 810 EEB Capital-Energia Holding
1 48.5 Chile-Spain
104 Thermal-Coal (EMGESA)
EEB-Distrib 1,085 EEB Luz-Bogota Holding
2 48.5 Chile-Spain
(CODENSA)
EEB-Trans. 141 EEB Capital-Energia Holding
1 5.5 Chile-Spain




ElectroCosta-Distrib CORELCA Houston Inc - Electricidad 65 USA-Ven
and Caracas
ElectroCaribe-Distrib 980 CORELCA Houston Inc - Electricidad 65 USA-Ven
Caracas
Transelca-Transm 180.5 CORELCA ISA 65 Colombia
Total Generation 5,228 2,532
Total Distribution 2,065
Total Transmission 462.5
Total Privatization 5,060  
Notes: EEB = Empresa de Energía de Bogota; EPSA = Empresa del Pacifico S.A (formerly CVC); CVC = 
Corporación Autónoma del Cauca; ICEL = Instituto Colombiano de Energía Eléctrica; CORELCA = Corporación 
Eléctrica de la Costa Atlántica; ISA = Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. 
1: Capital Energía = ENDESA (Chile) + ENDESA-Desarrollo (Spain) 
2: Luz Bogota = CHILECTRA (Chile) + ENERSIS (Chile) + ENDESA-Desarrollo (Spain) 
Sources: MME (1996) and (1998), reports to the Congress; ISA reports (1998, 1999).  
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The following section will focus on the performance analysis of the privatized firms in 
manufacturing and power utilities in order to provide an assessment of their privatization and 
economic deregulation policies. In these two sectors, assets transfers accounted for 90% of the 
total privatization sales in the productive sector as of mid-1999. 
 




This section studies firm performance within a sample of former IFI manufacturing enterprises 
and the privatized power holdings. It also provides an efficiency analysis of the thermal 
generation sector in which new regulations led to privatization, restructuring and the entry of new 
entities. The approach follows the general framework of Megginson et al. (1994) and La Porta 
and López-de-Silanes (1999) for performance analysis within the privatized power holdings. In 
the case of manufacturing, the methodology departs from benchmark cases in the definition and 
construction of the performance variables. The variables rely on measurements of: i) efficiency, 
ii) market power, iii) technology, and iv) profitability indicators that follow standard 
methodologies in industrial economics based on a combination of physical and financial series at 
plant level, which have an equivalent interpretation to those constructed from financial 
statements.  
There were two reasons for taking such measures. One was the lack of availability of data 
at the plant or firm level. In particular, there where no consistent records of the financial 
statements at IFI headquarters that would allow us to assemble a dataset similar to La Porta and 
López-de-Silanes (1999). The second reason was the quality of data. The most comprehensive 
longitudinal dataset is the Annual Manufacturing Survey (Encuesta Anual Manufacturera, or 
EAM) of Colombia’s National Statistics Department (Departamento Nacional de Estadística, or 
DANE). This survey is a census of medium and large manufacturing enterprises than has been 
undertaken annually since 1958. The dataset has been relatively homogeneous in its format since 
the 1970 industrial census regarding the recorded variables and the ISIC classification revision. 
In general, the EAM includes around 140 variables, covers 94 specific groups at the four-digit 
ISIC classification level, and surveys an average of 6,000 plants.
16 The survey reports productive 
                                                      
16 Although the EAM is published annually, the information at the plant level is restricted because of the Statistics 
Reserve Law, by which DANE protects the sources’ identities. We could access the EAM dataset at the plant level 
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variables such as gross output, number of employees, wages and benefits, raw materials, 
consumption of electricity, sales, gross investment, and some financial variables such as asset 
book value and accounting depreciation.  
The manufacturing dataset consists of 30 former IFI enterprises with records from the 
EAM. These businesses were at some point either publicly owned or mixed-capital companies 
for which IFI was a founding partner or strategic investor. Nineteen of those firms started 
business operations between the 1950s and mid-1970s. This means that incumbent plants are the 
dominating ones within the sample. For instance, the sample has the largest steel mills, tire and 
tube plants, pulp and paper mills, and basic industrial chemical plants. On the other hand, 21 
firms were part of the 1986–1997 IFI transfer program, accounting for 75% of total accumulated 
privatization sales. Four of them were exiting firms that were liquidated after 1992. The 
remaining firms are cases in which companies were either transferred to the private sector before 
1987 or the sale was postponed for strategic reasons. The dataset is an unbalanced panel that 
records individual information from 1974 to 1998. Hence, the panel permits analysis of market 
dynamics at the firm level by tracking entry and exit flows. That feature makes the study sample 
appealing because of the robustness and length of this dataset in contrast to the datasets used in 
other privatization studies, which at most have available time series with three or four 
observations before and after privatization (Megginson and Netter, 2001).
17  
One fact requires further comment. The dataset is free of measurement errors. That bias 
occurs in samples in which there are few observations before privatization. It is a well-known 
fact that financial records might be tampered with in order to improve profits from a sale and thus 
may overstate the gains of privatization. Other source of that bias occurs when state-owned 
enterprises are capitalized before privatization with the purpose of speeding up the sale process.
18 
Hence, outliers are easily detected and controlled with other variable trends within a time series 
context.
19 
                                                                                                                                                                            
thanks to the technical cooperation agreement between the University and DANE. All the information was processed 
at DANE’s headquarters. 
17 The Megginson and Netter (2001) paper is a comprehensive review of privatization studies. The paper provides a 
summary of the sample, study period and methodology of each reviewed case study. See Appendix 3 for a brief 
description of the EAM dataset. 
18 According to the La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) study this happened in Mexico when the government tried 
to initiate several restructuring processes.  
19 Appendix 3 summarizes the methodology used in the construction of the basic variables, the performance 
indicators and sources. 
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Table 5 presents a summary of the basic variables for the IFI sample and their weight in 
total manufacturing before and after privatization. Without any doubt the sample constitutes a 
representative selection of firms within Colombia’s manufacturing sector. For instance, the 
sample accounts for 5% of the industry’s value added, 3% of the industry’s employment, and 
most importantly, 20% of the total capital stock as well as power consumption of total 
manufacturing. The sample consists of larger capital-intensive plants. Regarding the power sector 
datasets, we were able to collect the historical financial reports for the privatized power holdings 
from several sources since 1983, which allowed us to replicate similar measures of profitability, 




Table 5. IFI Sample and Total Manufacturing 
Summary of the Basic Variables Pre- and Post-Privatization Periods 
Averages (US$ at 1995 Prices and Units) 
 
Variable
IFI (1) IND (2) IFI (3) IND (4) (1)/(2) (3)/(4)
Gross Output (Millions) 1,203 20,145 1,751 31,052 6.0 5.6
Value Added (Millions) 497 9,030 697 13,495 5.5 5.2
Total Employment 20,631 495,404 15,806 622,594 4.2 2.5
Gross Investment (Millions) 127 956 92 1,372 13.2 6.7
Capital Stock (Millions) 2,016 9,679 2,934 14,450 20.8 20.3
Number of Plants 25 6,356 27 7,475
Monthly per Capita Compensation 904 451 1,134 506






Source: Own estimations based on EAM’s DANE. 
 
                                                      
20 See Appendix 4 for a complete description of the power sector databases. 
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4.2  Changes in Performance in Manufacturing 
 
The study of IFI enterprises seeks to analyze changes in economic performance before and after 
privatization. The post-privatization period for the manufacturing sector has coincided with the 
economic openness policy implemented since the 1990s. In fact, 30 out of 37 IFI privatization 
contracts have taken place since March 1990. Thus, the analysis relies on the measurement of 
five types of indicators of performance and strategic competition: i) efficiency and productivity, 
ii) profitability and market concentration, iii) labor, iv) assets and investment, and v) sales or 
total output.  
The proxies are measured at the firm level. For incumbent firms the pre-privatization 
period is 1974–1989. Thus, changes in performance will capture two effects: i) privatization and 
ii) economic deregulation. For entrants, the time series start with the first recorded observation, 
which in most cases coincides with the startup year of commercial operations. The sample has 
four exiting firms, which shut down operations within the privatization period (1990–1998). The 
time period covered by the dataset allows us to assume that in most cases firms have had enough 
time to complete restructuring processes after privatization. Changes in performance are tested by 
means of the Mann-Whitney (1947) rank sum test. 
The idea from the statistical point of view is to consider privatization applied to matched 
samples as an experiment and test the null if the treatment was effective. This test is non-
parametric because data are ordered according to events that pertain to individuals from different 
groups.
21 The test relies on changes in medians rather than means because there is no need for 
assuming symmetry. If medians differ, then rejecting the null indicates that population medians 
come from different distributions. Hence, the experiment is effective if the observed change is 
statistically robust and matches the expected one. The number of usable observations (N) in this 
case matches the dimension of sample size—that is, the number of firms times the number of 
observed years before and after the privatization periods. Thus, the experiment is repeated m 
times before privatization and k times after it for each individual.
22   
The reading of the results is not straightforward because one has to analyze two forces 
behind the tests. On one hand, testing differences in sample means and assuming equal variances 
shows the direction of privatization effects. On the other hand, by testing for differences in 
                                                      
21 See Sprent and Smeeton (2001) for further explanation on tests for two independent samples.  
22 The size of m depends on the firm’s entry date as well as k for the exit one. Taking averages before and after 
privatization as in Megginson et al. (1994) enables us to only run the experiment once.  
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medians one is evaluating a change in the distribution shape, which may or may not coincide 
with the direction of the change in means. For instance, increases in the sample mean with a 
negative change in the median show that overall variation might be explained by a few 
individuals in the sample. Thus, privatization effects are not equally distributed or might have 
opposite results across firms.   
The basic results regarding performance changes in manufacturing are summarized in 
Table 6, which depicts the raw indicators, and Table 7, which presents the industry-adjusted 
indicators. The latter are ratios relative to specific ISIC industry classification groups. Several 
interesting outcomes are noticeable. IFI enterprises are highly profitable before privatization. For 
example, the mean of the Lerner index as proxy of the markup rate is 14.8%. That rate fell to 
12.7% during the 1990s. Moreover, the adjusted indicator shows that, on average, IFI firms were 
2.2 times more profitable than their private competitors before privatization. After privatization 
this ratio fell to 1.98 times. The median of the markup rate, although statistically insignificant, 
increased from 6.6% to 10%, meaning that there was a positive convergence within the sample, 
partly due to the exit of less profitable plants after 1990. Changes are statistically significant at 
the 5- and 10-percent levels. This result is clearly opposite to what has been found in most 
privatization studies in which unprofitable enterprises constituted a central argument in favor of 
equity transfers.  
Part of the explanation can be found in the economic openness program and the corporate 
structure of these firms. IFI firms were a central piece within the mixed strategy of import 
substitution with export diversification policy implemented since the mid-1960s.
23 These firms 
enjoyed high effective protection until 1990 and non-trade barriers such as import licenses. The 
drop observed in the mean of firm market share from 13.5% to 10.8% reflects the increase of 
imports within industry-specific domestic supply.  The adjusted indicator for market share fell 
from 0.20 times to 0.15 times showing a lower market concentration due to entry of foreign 
competition. Figure 1 depicts the markup rate evolution for the IFI sample and total 
manufacturing. Clearly, profitability shows a decreasing trend although IFI firms still show 
above-average profitability in manufacturing. Rate reduction during the 1990s pinned down that 
trend at around 10% markup rate levels.  
                                                      
23 Ocampo (1994) presents a comprehensive analysis of the trade policy and industrialization in Colombia for the 
1967−1991 period. 
  24 
Table 6. Changes in Performance for the Sample of Privatized IFI Firms 
T-Test and Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test 
 
Variable N N Mean Before Mean After t-stat
Before After Median Before Median After z-stat
I. Profitability






































IV. Assets and Investment





























Notes: a = significant at 0.05; b = significant at 0.1; c = statistically insignificant; 
Before privatization = 1974–1989; after privatization = 1990–1999. This table 
presents results for a sample of 28 manufacturing enterprises that were included in 
the 1988 IFI divestiture program. It presents for each empirical proxy the number 
of usable observations, the mean, and the median values before and after 1990. 
The table reports t-stat and z-stat (Mann-Whitney non-parametric rank sum) as the 
test for significance for the change in mean and median values, respectively. 
Capital and labor productivities are in 1995 US$. The capital-labor and investment 
per employee ratios are in 1995 US$. Definitions of each variable and its 
methodology can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Table 7. Industry-Adjusted Changes in Performance for the Sample of Privatized IFI Firms  
T-Test and Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test 
 
Variable NN
Before After Mean Before Mean After t-stat
Median Before Median After z-stat
I. Profitability


































IV. Assets and Investment































Special Notes: a = significant at 0.05; b = significant at 0.1; c = statistically 
insignificant; Before privatization = 1974–1989. After privatization = 1990–
1999. This table presents industry-adjusted results for the sample of 28 
manufacturing enterprises that were included in the 1988 IFI divestiture 
program. Industry control group is the four-digit ISIC group to which a specific 
firm belongs. For each year and firm we compute industry-adjusted indicator by 
taking the ratio of the value of the indicator for the IFI firm to its industry control 
group. The table presents for each empirical proxy the number of usable 
observations, the mean, and the median values before and after 1990, the 
privatization period. The table reports t-stat and z-stat (Mann-Whitney non-
parametric rank sum) as the test for significance of the change in mean and 
median values, respectively. Definitions of each variable and its methodology 
can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Source: Own estimates based on DANE’s EAM and Pombo (1999b). 
 
 
The gross margin rate is an indicator of working capital that shows how firms are restricted 
by payroll structures.
24 The change in medians of this indicator is positive and significant at the 
5-percent level, increasing from 60.8% to 68.9% after privatization. This result indicates that half 
of the distribution was able to adjust their payroll structure to efficiency parameters. Most former 
IFI firms have had strict union convention clauses. The 1990 labor market reform (Law 50) 
eliminated wage rigidities such as the retroactive severance pay system and the mandatory 
reinstatement regime for workers with more than 10 years on the payroll.
25 Thus, IFI firms could 
ease their payroll constraint and speed up the benefits derived from the 1990 labor reform after 
privatization. However, the industry-adjusted margin rate shows an opposite change in medians 
moving from 1.02 to 0.92 times. Such an outcome means that, despite the new contracting 
flexibility, private competitors increased their gross margin faster than IFI firms during the 
1990s. 
                                                      







= , where VA is the firm’s value added and W denotes wages.  
25 For details of the reforms of the 1990s, see Montenegro (1995).    
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Corporate structure is other explanatory factor of IFI firms’ profitability levels. As was 
pointed out in the previous section, those companies were in all cases mixed-capital enterprises. 
At the time of privatization sales, the share of IFI in manufacturing company equity was on 
average 24% and the accumulated sales were no greater than US$300 million (Table 2). The IFI 
retained its promoting role until the mid-1980s when the last three IFI manufacturing enterprises 
started commercial operations. These were the last industrial projects in which the IFI engaged in 
direct investments before becoming, in the 1990s, a second-tier financial institution.
26 The 
previous numbers make Colombia a rather special case in Latin America given the limited state 
participation, particularly in manufacturing, where the IFI’s policy of capital rotation implied a 
sale of equity once companies became incumbents and mature within the market. In Mexico for 
instance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) represented 38% of the economy’s capital stock by 
1982 and there were SOEs in almost all manufacturing groups. The same argument applies to 
Chile, which by 1970 was a highly state-controlled economy. In fact, SOE sales represented 14% 
of GDP in 1965. The government controlled the key foreign export sector of copper mining, and 
CORFO controlled most large manufacturing enterprises located in late industries such as paper 
and pulp manufacturing.
27  
Efficiency gains underpin part of the pro-competitive pricing strategy followed after trade 
liberalization. Average firm (median) labor productivity increased 43% (13%) at constant 
prices,
28 and the average total factor productivity (TFP) index rose by 22 basis points, which is 
equivalent to a 2.4% annual productivity growth rate. The change in TFP medians fell 11 basis 
points, meaning that efficiency gains were asymmetric across plants. The capital partial 
productivity median had a contraction of 58%, moving from US$1.29 per unit of installed fixed 
capital to US$0.75 at constant prices. The above changes are significant at the 5-percent level.  
  These results illustrate the direction of plant restructuring in these companies. IFI firms 
represent 20% of Colombia’s manufacturing capital stock (Table 5). The study sample consists of 
large capital-intensive plants. In fact, the measurements of capital-labor ratios show that IFI firms 
                                                      
26 The enterprises were one cement mill (Cementos Rioclaro) and two textile plants (Fatextol, Fedelartex S.A.). 
Appendix 2 presents the list of IFI enterprises included in this study.  
27 See La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) for more details about the Mexican privatization program. There are 
several studies on Chile’s privatization process. For more details, see for example Maloney (1994), Hachette, Luders 
and Tangle (1993), and the most recent study Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003). CORFO or Corporación de 
Fomento is the analog of IFI in Colombia. 
28 Partial productivities are expressed in US$ at 1995 prices. Thus, average labor productivity per worker before 
privatization was $30,487, and average productivity per unit of capital stock was $6.02.  
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were 4.9 times more capital intensive than the observed ratio within specific ISIC industry group 
before privatization. That number dropped to 4.1 after 1990. The behavior of the TFP index for 
the IFI sample closely follows the cycle for total manufacturing (Figure 2). Productivity 
plummets by 40 basis points according to the TFP index for IFI companies between 1979 and 
1983. This meant a –10% TFP growth per year, while the average efficiency loss in 
manufacturing was –2.6% per year. This productivity shock implied that even 15 years later the 
surviving firms have not been able to reach the TFP levels of the mid-1970s.   
 
Figure 2. IFI Sample and Total Manufacturing 




































































Source: Own estimates based on DANE’s EAM and Pombo (1999b). 
 
 
One factor that explains this cycle in productivity is the crisis in capital productivity of the 
1980s and its slow pace of recovery. The median dropped from US$1.3 per unit of capital to 
US$0.75 at constant prices after privatization. The adjusted indicator shows that for IFI firms the 
median of capital productivity was 1.8 times that of their private competitors. During the 1990s 
the number converged to 0.99 times, reaching industry-group benchmarks.  
Moreover, investment plummeted because of there was an over-investment problem. In 
fact, the mean (median) of the rate of capital accumulation dropped from rates of 9.1% (5.9%) 
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per year to rates of 5.9% (2.5%) per year, while the median of the investment rate fell from 6.9% 
to 5.5% per year. These changes are significant at the 5-percent level. On the other hand, the 
mean of investment per employee decreased from US$8,360 to US$6,418 per year at constant 
prices, while the medians remained unchanged. The change in the last indicator is not statistically 
significant. The changes in the adjusted indicators of investment rates are in the same direction. 
Figure 3 illustrates the over-investment problem for IFI companies where investment rates were 
2.5 times the level for total manufacturing until 1989. Thereafter the gap decreased to 1.4 times. 
Thus, IFI firms strongly rationalize capital spending in order to pin down excess capacity.
29   
 






































Source: Own estimations based on DANE’s EAM. 
 
There are various factors behind the sample’s over-investment. One is associated with the 
macroeconomic disequilibria of the late 1970s generated by coffee boom prices that appreciated 
the Colombian peso. Temporary trade liberalization, which enhanced capital goods imports, was 
another factor. Microeconomic factors also came into play. During the 1977–1983 period, the IFI 
and private investors undertook the two largest industrial investment projects since the 1960s. 
One is was a cement mill that began operations in 1977 and still is the country’s largest. The 
second project was the setting up of one of the largest nickel processing plants in Latin America. 
                                                      
29 The investment rate is defined as the ratio of gross investment to value added. Similarly, the accumulation rate is 
the ratio of gross investment to capital stock. See Appendix 3 for more details regarding definitions. 
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This industrial complex had the IFI as a founding partner with a 45% equity share, and started 
operations in 1983.
30  
  Similar results have been found in other country-specific studies of privatization. Equity 
transfers to private holders do not necessarily boost investment, as many government officials 
argue when calling for privatization. For the case of the IFI it is clear that most firms had an 
excess-capacity problem by the late 1980s. This became a bottleneck once the domestic market 
started to peter out as a source of demand growth.
31 Nonetheless, even in cases of decreasing 
trends in the investment rates, one might expect investment to become more selective through 
spending in new machinery because of the replacement of worn-out capital equipment. This was 
not the case for the IFI companies. The mean (median) embodied investment rate, which is 
defined as investment spending on machinery to total investment, declined from 86% (72%) to 
76% (70%). However, these changes are not statistically significant. The adjusted embodied 
investment rate shows that the median changed from 1.02 to 0.97 times after privatization and is 
significant at the 10-percent level. The above results on investment behavior suggest that part of 
firm restructuring after privatization relied on the reduction of excess capacity. 
  Labor productivity is the other component explaining the direction of the firms’ 
restructuring after privatization. As was pointed out, IFI firms were able to increase their TFP 
growth by a rate of 2.4% per year after 1990. However, those rates have not allowed a full 
recovery from the dramatic loss in capital productivity that those companies experienced during 
the 1980s. The mean (median) of labor productivity rose from US$30,487 ($21,161) to 
US$43,837 ($29,207) at constant prices. This change means a 43% real increase in value-added 
per worker. Employment cuts according to Table 2 were around 4,800 layoffs, representing a 
23% total payroll reduction within IFI companies after privatization. The layoff composition was 
3,700 workers, 750 administrative employees and 340 technicians. However, the changes in 
means and medians of the labor series by type of occupational category are not statistically 
significant.  
                                                      
30 The cement mill is Compañía Colombiana de Clinker (Colclinker), and the nickel processing plant is Cerromatoso. 
31 Garay’s (1998) study presents a demand-side growth decomposition exercise for Colombian manufacturing. The 
main result is that the contribution of Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) to manufacturing growth has not 
been positive since the mid-1970s.  For the case of Mexico La Porta and López-de-Silanes found that the mean 
(median) ratio of investment to sales of privatized firms is 3.58 (5.80) percentage points lower than the control group 
levels after privatization. In the study of Mexico the adjusted indicators are differences rather than ratios, which is 
the methodology used in this study.  
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  The adjusted labor indicators given by plant size show an increase in the mean from 5.58 to 
6.26 times, while the medians decrease from 3.64 to 2.96 times. These measurements also show 
that there are asymmetric effects of labor layoffs across plants, but the direction of change in 
medians suggests a movement in plant frequency distribution toward getting lower plant 
technology efficiency scales. Again these changes are statistically not conclusive; therefore one 
might have some caveats about the labor adjustment direction. In any case, labor cuts were small 
in contrast to other international experiences. The Mexican manufacturing payroll was halved 
during privatization (La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999), while the privatization of British 
Telecom involved the laying off of more than 5,000 workers (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 
1994).   
Figure 4 depicts the labor productivity indices for the IFI sample and for total 
manufacturing. The positive gap in labor productivity begins after 1983, which is as mentioned a 
turning point for the IFI firms’ productivity trends. The average value of the labor productivity 
gap was 20 points during the 1980s and thereafter was multiplied by nearly 3 times during the 
1990s (a difference of 62 basis points). Thus, IFI firms made greater efforts in increasing labor 
productivity relative to private competitors. This is partly explained by the moderate levels of 
layoffs but also by adjustment in plant efficiency scales, which by definition eliminates any 
diseconomies in production. The positive but lower rates of capital accumulation plus the payroll 
contraction after 1990 explain changes in plant capital-labor ratio. The mean (median) capital 
units per employee rose 32% (100%) at constant prices after privatization. The adjusted indicator 
also shows that IFI firm plants became more capital-intensive relative to their ISIC control group. 
The median changed from 0.67 to 0.97 times—that is, these firms effectively substituted capital 
for labor input adjusting their relation to industry benchmarks. The changes are significant at the 
5-percent level.  
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Figure 4. Labor Productivity Indices and Labor Productivity Gap 










































Source: Own estimations based on DANE’s EAM. 
 
 
Another important result is that IFI firms were able to increase their sales despite the 
payroll contraction and the lower rates of capital accumulation. Gross output mean (median) 
increases 38% (59%). The above number implies a 4.2% (6.5%) output growth rate per-year 
during the 1990s. The adjusted indicator shows that, on average, output scale rises from 6.3 to 
7.8 times in contrast to their control group. These results complement those found regarding plant 
size. On one hand, plant size adjustment implied a correction in minimal efficiency plant scale, 
but on the other hand, IFI firms were able to exploit new economies of scale. Thus, part of the 
observed TFP growth is explained by economies of scale and the rest might be due to 
technological change.
32  
  In sum, the results in changes in performance indicate that IFI firms followed pro-cyclical 
trends relative to their control group. That is, there was no asymmetric performance of these 
companies in contrast to their private peers. Part of the explanation for this is that IFI firms were 
mixed-capital enterprises and followed profit-maximizing pricing rules rather than pursuing 
                                                      
32 Unfortunately we do not have detailed discrete information across IFI firms regarding plant restructuring such as 
firms’ labor training programs, adjustments in plant automation, administrative adjustments, re-engineering in 
processes and products, and other specific restructuring strategies. What we do know according to some internal IFI 
documents and special publications sponsored by IFI (1987) and MDE (1995) is partial information regarding the 
technological history for some companies. 
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second-best prices or net transfers through subsidized sale prices. As a result, management 
strategies followed private sector benchmarks although rate-setting policy favored, at some 
points and for some cases, their dominant position within domestic markets. The supporting role 
of the IFI made it a non-principal shareholder but a strategic one for firm capitalization. 
Accordingly, the IFI never had the intention of setting company management policies. Regarding 
plant efficiency the results are consistent with the expected effects, but in this case, privatization 
helped to speed up firm labor restructuring, which implied a strong change in magnitude in the 
labor productivity indices. 
  
4.3  Changes in Performance in the Power Sector  
 
The ex-post performance analysis in the power sector takes into account the effects of the 1994 
reform on firm entry, market competition, and efficiency gains. In that sense, the analysis focuses 
on firm changes in means and medians of direct measures of profitability, efficiency, assets and 
investments, and sales of the privatized power holdings. The study sample covers the equity 
transfers in three out of five regional power systems where privatization took place, as described 
in Section 3. They are the former: i) Bogotá Power Company, ii) Cauca Valley Corporation 
(CVC) and iii) the Corporación Regional de la Costa Atlántica (CORELCA) holding. The control 
group is Public Enterprises of Medellín (EPM), which is a municipally owned company and has 
been traditionally the most efficient public enterprise not only in power generation and 
distribution but also in other services such as water and telecommunications. All series since 
1995 shared the assumption of the pre-reform electric holding structure in order to have 
comparable statistics.  
Tables 8 and 9 present the main results regarding the performance effects of privatization 
on the power holdings. Several facts are worth mentioning. First, the reform has had a direct and 
positive effect on utility operating efficiency. The average cost per unit dropped 45% at constant 
prices. The mean (median) of sales to PPE rose 17% (18%), while the mean (median) sales to 
employees rose 20.3% (15.7%). The same happened with the operating income to employee ratio 
where the mean (median) increase was 63% (48%) at constant prices after the reform. Changes 
are significant at the 5-percent level.  
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Table 8. Changes in Performance: Sample of Privatized Power Utilities and Public Enterprises, Medellín 
T-Test and Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test 
 
NN
Variable Before After Mean Before Mean After t-stat
Median Before Median After z-stat
I. Profitability






































IV. Assets and Investment






























Special Notes: a = significant at 0.05; b = significant at 0.1; c = statistically 
insignificant; before privatization = 1983–1994 period; after privatization = 1995–
1999; d = after privatization period = 1995–1996 due to availability of appropriate 
data. Values are in millions of pesos at constant 1995 prices. This table presents 
results for a sample of 3 privatized power holdings and Public Enterprises of 
Medellín (EPM) for 1983–1999. For each empirical proxy the number of usable 
observations, the mean, and the median values before and after the sector 
regulatory reform and ex-post privatization (1995) are presented. It reports t-stat 
and z-stat (Mann-Whitney non-parametric rank sum) as the test for significance of 
the change in mean and median values, respectively. More details on Colombia’s 
power sector datasets and definitions can be found in Appendix 4. 
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Table 9. Industry-Adjusted Changes in Performance Privatized Power Utilities 
T-Test and Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test 
 
NN
Variable Before After Mean Before Mean After t-stat
Median Before Median After z-stat
I. Profitability










































IV. Assets and Investment






























Special Notes: a = significant at 0.05; b = significant at 0.1; c = statistically 
insignificant; before privatization = 1983–1994 period; after privatization = 1995–
1999; d = after privatization period = 1995–1996 due to availability of appropriate 
data. This table presents the industry-adjusted results for a sample of 3 privatized 
power holdings for 1983–1999. The table presents for each empirical proxy the 
number of usable observations, the mean, and the median values before and after the 
sector regulatory reform and ex-post privatization (1995). Performance proxies are 
adjusted relative to Public Enterprises of Medellín. The table reports t-stat and z-stat 
(Mann-Whitney non-parametric rank sum) as the test for significance for the change 
in mean and median values, respectively. More details on Colombia’s power sector 
datasets and definitions can be found in Appendix 4. 
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There are at least three important sources of these efficiency gains. First, utilities made an 
effort to reduce both power losses and the under-collecting problem in distribution. This was the 
case for the Bogotá Power Company in particular, which drastically reduced it power loss indices 
from 53% in 1985 to 22% in 1996. The same trend is observed for the other privatized 
holdings.
33  
Second, the reform and privatization induced new investment in incumbent firms, in 
contrast to what was observed for manufacturing. All investment rates at least doubled on 
average. Notice that capital stock remains unchanged, but this is not statistically significant. Total 
assets usually have several biases depending on the depreciation schedules. For that reason a 
more accurate indicator is the current investment rates. Notice that in most cases the changes in 
performance of operating efficiency and investment-adjusted indicators are not statistically 
significant with respect to their control group. The reading of such a result is that, despite efforts 
made by the newly privatized and divested electric holdings, these were not enough to surpass 
EPM’s (Public Enterprises of Medellín’s) efficiency changes.  
  Third, employment cuts were not as significant as in the case of manufacturing. The four 
electric holdings had on average 13,300 employees before the reform. This number only 
decreased to 11,600 employees during the 1995–1999 period. Thus, the observed 23% real 
increase in labor productivity was due to the increase in sales rather than drastic employment 
cuts. In fact, the mean (median) of sales increased by 16.4% (21.1%). One must keep in mind 
that the 1994 reform adopted a mixed model for the provision of electricity, given the appropriate 
signals to private investors in undertaking long-lasting efforts. This new investment implied that 
firms received embodied efficiency gains. This point becomes clear with the evolution of thermal 
capacity as depicted in Figure 5, which clearly shows sharp increases in thermal capacity and a 
doubling during the 1990s.  
                                                      
33 See Pombo (2001b) for more details. The point here is that there are two sources of power losses. One is the 
technical loss due to the power losses in transmission necessary to maintain the system’s stability. The non-technical 
loss is the difference between real consumption and invoicing. Cities such as Bogotá used to have power stealing, 
illegal connections, and adulterated meters among other irregularities.  
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Source: ISA reports. 
Notes: TGEN: Thermal Generation; ACAP: Available Capacity; ECAP: Effective Capacity 
 
The new regulation has used two instruments to provide incentives to market entry. One is 
the design of capacity charges by which the regulator guarantees a minimum return on the 
installed capacity. The second instrument is the power purchase agreements (PPAs). These are 
long-term contracts through which generators hedge against unexpected changes in demand and 
distributors hedge against system constraints. One type of PPA initially implemented in 
Colombia is to pay what is generated, which involves an advance purchase of plant capacity. 
Most thermal generators are marginal producers whose objective is to generate a hedge for the 
system. In fact, the thermal park had 63 plants with an effective capacity of 3,800 MW in 1998, 
which represents a 32% share. Among them 21 started commercial operations after 1993 and 16 
are privately owned. This is not a coincidence since the government had already undertaken an 
emergency expansion plan to overcome the 1992 power generation crisis.
34  
   A second factor illustrated by Figure 5 is that the ratio of power generation to available 
capacity ratio improved after the reform. Clearly, the 1992–1993 and 1997 periods reflect poor 
                                                      
34 An analysis of the 1992 blackout is in Pombo (2001b). The official version of the blackout causes and policy 
measures is in the 1993 Ministry of Mining report to the Congress.  
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hydrology and the El Niño cycle, but there is a difference between them. In 1992 there was a 
rationing of about 16% of the power demand and by June 1993, when the power rationing was 
over, the power generation to available capacity ratio was over 0.8, reflecting the insufficiency of 
the thermal park in providing backup for the system. In contrast, that ratio was 0.35 when the 
second El Niño ended in June 1998. In sum, fixed investment in thermal generation has played a 
central role in improving system reliability as well as promoting market entry in power 
generation. The behavior of profitability indicators, however, did not mirror the efficiency gains. 
Notice the striking result that all profitability indicators, adjusted and unadjusted, dropped after 
the regulatory reform. The mean (median) of operating income to sales ratio was 32.1% (35.8%) 
before the reform for the study sample. The indicator fell to 18.9% (22.6%) during the post-
reform years.    
Operating income to PPE or Net Worth, as indicators of firms’ profit rates of gross and net 
fixed assets respectively, were reduced by close to one half. The above changes are significant at 
the 5-percent level. The adjusted indicators show the same behavior. That is, the privatized 
holdings lost relative profitability with respect to their control group. These results, as in the case 
of manufacturing, are opposite to the expected effects of privatization on firm profitability. The 
conventional wisdom would say that any gains in input productivity must have a direct impact on 
firm profitability rates if and only if there are not drastic changes in market competition. The 
1994 regulatory reform implied more competition within the market in power generation and 
distribution. First, ownership composition changed drastically within the first five years after the 
regulatory reform, which has induced a balanced distribution of the power generating capacity 
between public and private utilities. By 1998 public utilities counted for 42% of the power 
generating capacity while private and mixed-capital utilities held a 58% share. The largest 
generator has a 21% market share.
35 This outcome contrasts with the initial divestiture in the UK 
where the CEGB was split into a duopoly for non-nuclear generation, and in Chile where the 
three largest power generators control 85% of the market.  
On the power distribution side, privatized utilities dropped their final rates after 1995. 
Moreover, they have converged to EPM’s final-user rates. The relative rate for regulated users 
dropped from 1.70 to 1.04 after the reform. If one takes into account the non-regulated electricity 
                                                      
35 See Pombo (2001b) for more details. The National Interconnected System was formed by 33 hydro centrals plus 
63 thermal plants distributed among 26 power companies in 1998. EMGESA, the largest generator, was founded 
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market, the drop must be even greater. Table 10 summarizes the main variables of the electricity 
market. Two facts are noteworthy. First, the evolution of electricity spot prices suggests that 
buyers—power distributors—have effectively hedged against pool price volatility. Real contract 
prices dropped 42% from 1996 to 2000. That outcome is important since contracts have a 75% 
market share in bulk electricity. Another important outcome is that market deregulation has 
sharply increased the number of non-regulated users, most of which are large industrial and 
commercial clients. In fact, the definition of “large customer” has changed over time. It began 
with a minimum individual consumption of 2.5 MW/month and has gradually decreased. The 
current level is at 0.1 MW/month, implying that non-regulated demand doubles during the 
analyzed period and accounts for 25% of today’s commercial demand for electricity. There was 
an additional factor that contributed to narrowing gross and net utility profits. There was a sharp 
increase in financial costs during the first half of the 1990s. The four regional markets under 
study had on average a 90% real increase in their financial costs relative to the average of the 
1980s. The Bogotá Power Company faced most of the indebtedness burden because of the over-
costs generated by the five-year delay in the startup of the Guavio hydroelectric plant.
36  
 
Table 10. Market Efficiency Variables - Annual Averages 
(US$ at Dec 1998 Prices, GWh, units) 
 
Date Mean Mean Spot PPAs Demand Non Regulated Non- Non-
Spot PPAs Price Price Met Regulated Demand Regulated Regulated
Price Price Index Index Demand Demand Users
US$/KWh US$/KWh Dec98=100 Dec98=100 GWh GWh GWh Share Number
Dec-96 0.0086 0.0349 54.1 125.3 3,543.1 457.3 2,869.7 0.1374 18.0
Dec-97 0.0680 0.0323 425.6 115.8 3,650.9 452.3 2,963.3 0.1330 100.5
Dec-98 0.0283 0.0285 176.8 102.3 3,595.5 649.0 2,810.4 0.1876 692.0
Dec-99 0.0159 0.0220 99.4 78.9 3,466.1 686.3 2,662.8 0.2050 906.3
Dec-00 0.0215 0.0202 134.8 72.7 3,422.6 865.1 2,566.9 0.2522 2,471.0 
Sources: MEM and ISA reports. 
Notes: Value series in US$ deflated by US CPI. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
after the Bogotá Power Company divestiture. On the other hand, no single power generator can have more than ¼ of 
system’s generating capacity (Law 143).  
36 The Guavio hydroelectric plant is the largest in the country with 1600 MW of capacity. 
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4.4  An Analysis of the Productive Efficiency of Thermal Plants 
 
The main result of the previous section was that the 1994 regulatory reform indeed induced 
power firms to achieve improvements in efficiency due to market competition, to put forth effort 
on the distribution side to pin down the non-technical power losses, and to undertake new 
investments in power generating capacity. This section presents the measurement of productive 
efficiency at plant-level for a sample of thermal plants. Fifty-five plants that belong to the 
interconnected system have made up the thermal park since 1995. Nonetheless, just 32 units were 
active, having a permanent or temporary production within a specific year.  Because of changes 
in the statistical sources, the dataset was divided in two samples. The first sample records on 
average 33 thermal plants from 1988–1994—that is, the pre-reform years. The second one 
records 32 thermal units for the post-reform years (1995–2000).  
  The measurement of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) efficiency scores requires information 
of inputs and output by thermal unit. Plant inputs are capital (or capacity in MW), labor (number 
of employees), and fuel consumption (coal, gas, fuel oil, and diesel oil). All fuels must have a 
common measure unit, such as BTUs or T-Calories.
37 Output is given in millions of KWh 
(GWh). Information for power generation, consumption by type of fuel and capacity at plant-
level is available by crossing the different datasets before and after 1994.  
  Labor input is not directly observable for most units. There are two reasons for that 
problem. One is that before privatization thermal units were vertically integrated with power 
utilities, thus payroll series were recorded following accounting criteria. Power companies kept 
labor records to fulfill the requirements of financial reporting. Second, there was no regulator 
requesting information by power activity. Labor statistics after 1996 have improved sharply since 
the regulator (Superintendent of Domiciliary Public Services) has been in charge of the SIVICO 
database. Labor series by power company are broken down by occupational categories, sectoral 
activities (i.e. generation, transmission, and distribution), and by type of power generation. In 
addition, after privatization the plants that were sold became new utilities. This allowed for 
making direct inferences of labor input (number of employees) by thermal substations. Fixed 
                                                      
37 BTUs stands for British thermal unit; the basic conversion factors are: 1 kWh = 3,412.1 BTUs; 1 GWh = 0.86 T-
Calories; 1 MW of Capacity = 1,000 KWh. 
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coefficients of labor to capacity were assumed based on the information sent by power generators 
in order to complete labor series before 1995.
38  
  Table 11 displays the results of the efficiency frontier measurement exercise. The most 
important outcome is that the efficient units before the reform have not been the most efficient 
since the reform. This suggests that there was a downward shift in the efficiency frontier 
implying an efficiency gain due to entry and new gas-based and combined-cycle technologies. In 
fact, Termoeléctrica de Barranquilla S.A (TEBSA), which is the largest thermal generator in the 
country, as well as the other newer plants built after 1993, exhibit efficiency scores close to 1. 
The next section turns to modeling efficiency and profitability as functions of plant 
characteristics, ownership structure, and regulatory policy variables for the former IFI firms and 
the sample of thermal plants, with the purpose of shedding light on the determinants of those 
performance variables.  
                                                      
38 Appendix 4 describes the methodology and the contents of the power sector databases. The request for labor series 
was made through the Colombian Power Generator Association (ACOLGEN). SIVICO stands for Sistema de 
Vigilancia y Control.  
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Table 11. DEA Efficiency Scores: Main Results before and after the Regulatory Reform 
 
DMU Plant Plant Owner- Cap Score Score Score1 Score1 Relative Relative
Name Startup ship MW Before After Before After Effic. Effic.1
1 Barranca1 1982 Public 13 78.59% 59.32% 78.59% 79.39% decrease increase
2 Barranca2 1982 Public 13 72.03% 59.32% 74.48% 77.02% decrease increase
3 Barranca3 1972 Public 66 87.98% 64.04% 87.98% 82.11% decrease decrease
4 Barranca4 1983 Public 32 66.25% 61.18% 66.25% 81.10% decrease increase
5 Barranca5 1983 Public 21 70.23% 61.76% 70.23% 82.17% decrease increase
6 Bquilla1 1980 Public 58 92.11% . 91.39% . .
7 Bquilla3 1980 Private 66 100.00% 66.24% 100.00% 71.56% decrease decrease
8 Bquilla4 1980 Private 69 96.99% 74.39% 98.03% 100.00% decrease increase
9 Cartagena1 1980 Private 66 86.77% 64.28% 100.00% 74.47% decrease decrease
10 Cartagena2 1980 Private 54 79.32% 65.15% 74.37% 82.74% decrease increase
11 Cartagena3 1980 Private 67 87.12% 68.15% 86.03% 82.45% decrease decrease
12 Chinu4 1982 Public 14 42.42% . 70.97% . .
13 Cospique1 1960 Public 4 90.86% . 100.00% . .
14 Cospique2 1960 Public 4 72.77% . 100.00% . .
15 Cospique3 1967 Public 8 100.00% . 97.22% . .
16 Cospique4 1966 Public 9 100.00% . 77.91% . .
17 Cospique5 1965 Public 12 44.87% . 85.84% . .
18 Flores1 1993 Private 152 98.81% 100.00% 98.81% 100.00% increase increase
19 Guajira1 1987 Public 160 100.00% 85.63% 100.00% 77.43% decrease decrease
20 Guajira2 1987 Public 160 100.00% 83.74% 100.00% 89.15% decrease decrease
21 Paipa 1 1963 Public 31 40.48% 49.77% 32.08% 88.59% increase increase
22 Paipa 2 1975 Public 74 73.07% 37.94% 47.55% 78.91% decrease increase
23 Paipa3 1978 Public 74 63.31% 41.54% 38.74% 77.35% decrease increase
24 Palenque 3-4 1972 Public 15 87.80% 45.86% 100.00% 80.11% decrease decrease
25 Palenque5 1985 Public 21 67.06% . 67.06% . .
26 Proeléctrica1 1993 Private 46 99.93% 96.95% 99.93% 88.57% decrease decrease
27 Proeléctrica2 1993 Private 46 100.00% 96.95% 100.00% 96.54% decrease decrease
28 Tasajero 1985 Private 163 100.00% 67.55% 100.00% 82.41% decrease decrease
29 Tibú1 1965 Public 6 16.69% . 31.57% . .
30 Tibú2 1965 Public 6 16.32% . 80.26% . .
31 Zipa2-3 1976 Mixed 104 49.04% 88.88% 42.13% 67.21% increase increase
32 ZIPA3 1976 Mixed 66 . 22.35% . 80.21% .
33 Zipa4 1981 Mixed 66 46.26% 18.79% 46.01% 67.97% decrease increase
34 Zipa5 1985 Mixed 66 26.92% 32.13% 30.42% 86.55% increase increase
35 Flores2 1996 Private 100 . 91.99% . 92.05% .
36 Flores3 1998 Private 152 . 100.00% . 100.00% .
37 Merilectrica  1998 Private 157 . 78.87% . 92.73% .
38 TebsaB1 1998 Private 768 . 100.00% . 91.41% .
39 Termocentro1  1997 Public 99 . 91.60% . 100.00% .
40 Dorada1 1997 Public 52 . 25.54% . 80.10% .
41 Sierra1 1998 Public 150 . 14.42% . 85.64% .
42 Termovalle1 1998 Private 214 . 82.37% . 88.58% .
Total Decrease (plants) 19 10
Share Capacity 36.1% 24.3% 
Sources: Own estimations based on EMS 1.3 software written by Scheel (2000).   
Notes: DMU = Decision-making unit; Input1: Capacity in MW; Input2: Labor in Number of Employees; Input3: 
Fuels, standardized in T-Calories; Periods: Before Privatization 1988–1994; After Privatization: 1995–2000; Input-
Output variables are annual averages; Score Assumptions: CRTS, No weights, Input-Oriented; Score1 Assumptions: 
CRTS, No weights, Input-Oriented, Capacity corrected by short run unavailability index = MW * (1-SRUI) or 
capacity utilization (after 1994). 
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5.  Econometric Analysis 
 
5.1  IFI Manufacturing Plants 
 
This section analyzes the role that plant characteristics, foreign trade variables, and privatization 
played in determining privatization outcomes for the sample of IFI firms. The econometric 
analysis focuses on two key performance variables: plant profitability rates (Lerner indices) and 
the translog indices of total factor productivity (TFP) as a proxy of technological change. In that 
sense, the econometric exercise hopes to shed light on plant efficiency and markup determinants 
as well as to evaluate the significance of privatization within the model. The dataset is an 
unbalanced panel of 28 IFI firms that records information for the 1974–1998 period.  
The estimating equation follows the baseline pooled regression model:  
 
it i it e performanc ε α β + Λ + + + = it it Z B X ) ( 0  (1) 
 
where i = 1, ..., n  is the number of individuals; t = 1, 2,...,T is the number of observations in each 
panel; X = firm characteristics variables; and Z = specific ISIC variables. Equation (1) allows the 
running of several types of regression models according to specific assumptions on the residual 
variance-covariance matrices and individual effects (αi). In particular, the estimations relax the 
assumptions of constant variance across panels, the non-existence of individual effects, and 
instrument for endogeneity on right-hand side variables.  
Plant characteristic variables are related to technology structures, labor composition, and 
the firm’s market positioning actions. One expected result is that technology-related variables 
have a positive impact on profitability gains. In that sense, plant size, operative scale, quality of 
raw materials, capital intensity and relative labor productivity result in lower average costs that 
represent productivity gains due to new economies of scale. Plant payroll composition will reflect 
quality in labor input. Thus, technicians should lead overall plant labor productivity because 
skilled workers are more dynamic and generate productivity spillovers. Administrative 
employees in turn may generate inflexibilities that end up hurting profitability. Market 
positioning variables are those actions that strengthen a firm’s market share. The firm’s signals 
are investment rates, the usage of technological licenses, and product differentiation tactics such 
as advertising. These actions may persuade rivals to soften competition and adopt collusive 
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prices but, on the other hand, a competitor’s best response might include hardening competition 
and setting dumping prices. Hence, there is no expected sign.   
  Industry-specific variables are mostly related to foreign trade. Three main variables are 
used in the estimating equations: nominal tariffs, effective protection rates, and Grubel and Lloyd 
(1975) indices. The latter is a proxy for trade in differentiated goods.
39 Protectionism increases 
domestic profitability through entry deterrence. Intraindustry trade, in contrast, implies trade in 
similar goods that makes entry a credible threat driving sale prices to second-best prices.
40 
Hence, profitability decreases.  
Table 12 displays the main results regarding the markup determinants, which call for 
several comments. First, in all cases, the firm’s market share is the robust determinant. This is 
consistent with the observation that economic openness reduced the firm’s market power and 
therefore decreased markup rates. Estimations show that a 10% decrease in market share will 
reduce profitability by 9%.  
  Second, the foreign trade variables are robust regressors and show the expected sign. On 
average, an increase of 10% in the effective protection rate will increase markups by 4%. In 
contrast, if intraindustry trade indices rise 10%, markups will decrease on average by 3%. This 
finding is important from the perspective of strategic trade policy. Competition through similar 
goods forces firms to undertake further specialization strategies to promote efficiency gains in 
order to compensate for the reduction in markup rates. Third, plant size and productive efficiency 
are important sources of profitability gains. IFI firms are on average seven times larger than their 
competitors. As a result the observed gains in TFP partially offset the falling trend in firm 
markup. On average, if TFP indices rise 10 points they will induce a change of between 0.005 
and 0.02 points in markup rates. Fourth, privatization shows a consistent sign. Privatization 
induced a 1.2% increase in profit rates (Eq. 3). Finally, the foreign investment dummy has the 
opposite sign. In the context of the IFI sample this result is not surprising since some firms are 
located in formerly highly protected industries that kept lower efficiency levels with respect to 
parent firms and international standards. 
                                                      
39 See Pombo (2001a) for a specific study on intraindustry trade and technology applied to the case of Colombia.  
40 This idea is similar to the competition behind contestabilility in which firms apply the hit and run strategy in order 
to capture profits. However, in this case there are significant sunk costs. For theoretical details, see Baumol, Panzar 
and Willing (1988) and Baumol (1982).  
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Table 12. Ex-Post Performance Determinants for IFI Firms 
Pooled, Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variable Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
 
Independent Variables Pooled Panel Panel Within Pooled Pooled
OLS
1 FGLS FGLS FE 2SLS
1 2SLS
1 FE+IV
Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 6 Eq 7
Relative Partial Productivity of Labor 0.3803 0.3633 0.3295 0.2219 0.4811 0.4503 0.2384
(0.0598) (0.0321) (0.0318) (0.0248) (0.0769) (0.0727) (0.0223)
Relative Partial Productivity of Capital -0.0094 -0.0049 -0.0050 - -0.0103 -0.0092 -
(0.0017) (0.001) (0.0009) - (0.0019) (0.002) -
Demand Growth [ISIC-specific] 0.2011 0.0812 0.0977 - 0.1915 0.1722 -
(0.0782) (0.0457)* (0.0444) - (0.0783) (0.0791) -
Scale -0.0316 -0.0190 -0.0175 -0.0136 -0.0262 -0.0247 -0.0185
(0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0035)
Licensing 7.9312 7.9246 8.1922 - 5.3740 4.4938 -
(1.9463) (1.3614) (1.4664) - (2.1096) (2.0138) -
Relative Compensation -0.3283 -0.1031 -0.1135 0.9975 -0.2392 -0.2480 -
(0.0943) (0.0424) (0.0432) (0.0371) (0.1125) (0.1083) -
Advertising Coefficient -2.2255 -1.6442 -1.4812 - -2.2842 -2.2048 -
(0.5537) (0.4407) (0.4422) - (0.5543) (0.5207) -
Log Technicians 0.1152 0.1019 0.0778 0.1418 0.1875 0.1840 0.1071
(0.0324) (0.0176) (0.0163) (0.0262) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0215)
Privatization Dummy 0.3626 0.5253 - - 0.2700 0.2757 -
(0.1073) (0.0438) - - (0.1118) (0.1112) -
Lerner Index - -0.4968 -0.4130 1.3185 -2.1912 -2.0258 1.3116
- (0.1570) (0.1502) (0.2899) (0.4225) (0.4223) (0.3626)
Log Value Added [ISIC-specific] - - - 0.3308 - - 0.2702
- - - (0.0462) - - (0.0412)
Relative Capital Labor Ratio - - - - - 0.0107 -0.0339
- - - - - (0.0061) (0.0040)
- ------
Constant 0.9934 0.614 0.7227 -5.7045 0.8739 0.8563 -4.3417
Regression Statistics
R2 0.1954 0.2708 0.1663 0.2940 0.4747
Num of groups 28 28 28 28
Num Obs 554 554 554 575 554 564 476
Obs per Group: Min 4 4 5 5
                        Max 24 24 25 25
F-test 22.9 40.25 20.7 85.1 54.93
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Wald-Chi2(k-1) 289.6 296.4
[0.0000] [0.0000]





Breuch-Pagan LM stat 158.9
[0.0000]
Variance Matrix Residuals
Homoskedastic panels yes no no yes yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables no no no no yes yes yes
RHS Endogenous Variables Lerner Lerner Lerner
Other Equations in System Lerner = F( mshare, grubel, efepro)  
 
Notes: 1:/ White-Hubert robust heteroskedastic standard errors; standard errors appear in parentheses; and p-values 
in square brackets. All series are described in the Appendix 3. All regression coefficients are significant at 0.05, 
unless otherwise stated. *: Significant at 0.1; ** Statistically insignificant.  
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The econometric results on productive efficiency are displayed in Table 13. Five comments 
are worth making. First, plant characteristics are relevant for TFP indices. All equations show 
that plant labor productivity, licensing and number of technicians have positive effects. On 
average, an increase of 10% in partial labor productivity relative to specific ISIC group raises 
TFP by 3.2%. The effect of licensing is the largest. If plants expand their technological licensing 
spending relative to their value added by 1%, this will boost productivity by between 5.5 and 8.2 
times. This finding is consistent with previous results for total manufacturing, and calls attention 
to the short-run effectiveness of using patented licenses for improving productivity rather than 
engaging in direct research and development spending.
41 The number of technicians is a proxy 
for labor input quality. A 10 % increase in this variable will improve productivity by 1.12%.  
Second, the equation included two variables to capture demand effects on TFP measured 
either by the growth in value added or the log value of firm’s specific ISIC group. The sign 
matches with the expected one, which is consistent with the traditional hypothesis derived from 
the Verdoom law by which growth and productivity are constrained by effective demand. The 
impact of aggregate demand is two-fold: domestic demand and export demand induce growth and 
improve productivity by learning. This in turn leads to improvements in price competitiveness 
that will induce higher levels of effective demand (Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975).
42  
Third, privatization had a positive effect on productivity, causing an increase ranging from 
0.27 to 0.50 points on TFP indices. Fourth, the scale and the adjusted capital partial productivity 
coefficients had a negative impact on productivity. The interpretation of this result is not 
straightforward. The losses in capital productivity due to over-investment suggest that IFI firms 
adjusted capital spending in order to close gaps with industry benchmarks. Fifth, profitability 
rates exhibit the opposite effect on TFP, which is not consistent with the self investment-
financing hypothesis of endogenous growth models (Romer, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995). In particular, one should expect a positive impact since larger profitability rates ease the 
self-financing of capital equipment and firms’ R and D spending. However, after controlling for 
fixed effects the expected sign is recovered. The within-regression coefficients show that a 10% 
                                                      
41 For details see Pombo (1999b). This study highlights two key technology policy issues. First, based on the results 
of DNP’s technological survey, cross-section regressions showed an inverse relation between TFP growth rates and 
qualitative information about plants’ R and D infrastructure such as laboratories, prototype design and pilot plants. 
Second, based on panel data regressions the effect of a 10% increase in licensing will increase TFP by 12%.   
42 Notice that the possible simultaneity bias that arises from running TFP against value added growth is avoided–
partially–here because value added growth refers to overall industry-specific group.  
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increase in markups will improve TFP by 13%. The above result suggests that allowing fixed 
effects for modeling productivity is a better econometric specification. 
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Table 13. Ex-Post Performance Determinants for IFI Firms 
Pooled, Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variable Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Translog Index of TFP 
 
Independent Variables Pooled Panel Panel Within Pooled Pooled
OLS
1 FGLS FGLS FE 2SLS
1 2SLS
1 FE+IV
Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 6 Eq 7
Relative Partial Productivity of Labor 0.3803 0.3633 0.3295 0.2219 0.4811 0.4503 0.2384
(0.0598) (0.0321) (0.0318) (0.0248) (0.0769) (0.0727) (0.0223)
Relative Partial Productivity of Capital -0.0094 -0.0049 -0.0050 - -0.0103 -0.0092 -
(0.0017) (0.001) (0.0009) - (0.0019) (0.002) -
Demand Growth [ISIC-specific] 0.2011 0.0812 0.0977 - 0.1915 0.1722 -
(0.0782) (0.0457)* (0.0444) - (0.0783) (0.0791) -
Scale -0.0316 -0.0190 -0.0175 -0.0136 -0.0262 -0.0247 -0.0185
(0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0035)
Licensing 7.9312 7.9246 8.1922 - 5.3740 4.4938 -
(1.9463) (1.3614) (1.4664) - (2.1096) (2.0138) -
Relative Compensation -0.3283 -0.1031 -0.1135 0.9975 -0.2392 -0.2480 -
(0.0943) (0.0424) (0.0432) (0.0371) (0.1125) (0.1083) -
Advertising Coefficient -2.2255 -1.6442 -1.4812 - -2.2842 -2.2048 -
(0.5537) (0.4407) (0.4422) - (0.5543) (0.5207) -
Log Technicians 0.1152 0.1019 0.0778 0.1418 0.1875 0.1840 0.1071
(0.0324) (0.0176) (0.0163) (0.0262) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0215)
Privatization Dummy 0.3626 0.5253 - - 0.2700 0.2757 -
(0.1073) (0.0438) - - (0.1118) (0.1112) -
Lerner Index - -0.4968 -0.4130 1.3185 -2.1912 -2.0258 1.3116
- (0.1570) (0.1502) (0.2899) (0.4225) (0.4223) (0.3626)
Log Value Added [ISIC-specific] - - - 0.3308 - - 0.2702
- - - (0.0462) - - (0.0412)
Relative Capital Labor Ratio - - - - - 0.0107 -0.0339
- - - - - (0.0061) (0.0040)
--- - - -
Constant 0.9934 0.614 0.7227 -5.7045 0.8739 0.8563 -4.3417
Regression Statistics
R2 0.1954 0.2708 0.1663 0.2940 0.4747
Num of groups 28 28 28 28
Num Obs 554 554 554 575 554 564 476
Obs per Group: Min 4 4 5 5
                        Max 24 24 25 25
F-test 22.9 40.25 20.7 85.1 54.93
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Wald-Chi2(k-1) 289.6 296.4
[0.0000] [0.0000]





Breuch-Pagan LM stat 158.9
[0.0000]
Variance Matrix Residuals
Homoskedastic panels yes no no yes yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables no no no no yes yes yes
RHS Endogenous Variables Lerner Lerner Lerner
Other Equations in System Lerner = F( mshare, grubel, efepro)
-
 
Notes: 1:/ White-Hubert robust heteroskedastic standard errors; standard errors appear in parentheses, and p-
values in square brackets. All series are described in Appendix 3. All regression coefficients are significant at 
0.05, unless otherwise stated.  *: Significant at 0.1; ** Statistically insignificant; TFP indices at starting year t 
= 1; Demand Growth = change in ISIC-specific value added.             
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5.2  Power Plants: Statistical Analysis of Efficiency Scores 
 
This section reports the results of an econometric analysis of thermal power plant DEA efficiency 
scores. The exercise follows a limited dependent variable model because the dependent variable 
under analysis is censored by construction. It takes positive values and is bounded at 1.00; thus, 
the efficient plants will record an efficiency score  − − it y  of one. Otherwise,  1 0 < ≤ it y . The 
sample might also be truncated because there is knowledge of independent variables if only   is 
observed. This is particularly important for marginal power producers when the thermal plants 
are shut down by maintenance, transmission, and generation constraints because there is no 












B x'it  
otherwise
yit 1 0 ≤ <      (2) 
  
and the residuals are I.I.D following a normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance.   
  Equation (2) models efficiency scores as a function of plant characteristics, ownership 
structure, and regulatory related policy dummies. Plant characteristics include plant age, capital-
labor ratio, technology type, and load factor. Controlling for the load factor indicates how 
marginal a given producer is.
43 A dummy that takes the value of 1 for all private plants captures 
ownership. The regulatory dummy tries to capture the effect of large customer definition. Thus, 
for each plant that dummy takes a value of one after 1998 (when the lower limit for large clients 
was set in 0.5 MW/month, which implied a jump from 100 to 900 non-regulated users on 
average). The dataset includes all observed records from each one of the 32 active thermal plants 
during the 1995 to 2000 period. Therefore, the dataset is an unbalanced panel with 166 
observations.  
  Table 14 displays the parameter estimates from the Tobit analysis. The efficiency scores in 
the first two equations are input-oriented measurements under the assumption of CRTS convex 
technology. In the third equation efficiency scores take into account the adjustment in capital 
input by capacity utilization. Such adjustment normalizes plant capacity by load factor, which 
means that all producers are treated as if they were off-peak generators.  
                                                      
43 The definition of load factor for this exercise is: 
76 . 8 * K
GWh
1000 / ) 24 * 365 ( * K
GWh
= = LF  
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Table 14. Tobit Regressions: Longitudinal Data, Thermal Plants, Efficiency Scores (1995−2000) 
Dependent Variable: Input-Oriented Efficiency Scores 
Pooled Pooled Pooled
Tobit Tobit Tobit
E q  1E q  2E q  3




Age -0.0155 -0.0175 -0.0170
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0029)
Age-Squared 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(6E-04) (6E-05) (9.4E-05)
Load Factor 0.4169 0.3700 0.1577
(0.0445) (0.031) (0.049)




Dummy Gas 0.3653 0.3704 0.4170
(0.0118) (0.0122) (0.023)
Dummy Combine Cycle 0.1431
(0.0923)**
Dummy Private Ownership 0.0323
(0.0116)
Dummy Public Ownership -0.0423
(0.0117)
Dummy Regional Market -0.0494
(0.0258)*
Dummy Regulatory Policy 0.0201 0.0229 0.0382
(0.0108)* (0.0112) (0.1762)
Constant 0.4098 0.4593 0.4869
Sigma 0.0660 0.0691 0.1095
Regression Statistics
R2-OLS 0.9104 0.9074 0.7791
Uncensored Obs 155 156 152
Censored Obs 7 10 10
LR~Chi(k-1) 377.3 379.5 225.5
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Tests -  Residuals
Cook-Weisberg -OLS 0.00 0.04 1.83
[0.9924] [0.8445] [0.1756]
Breuch Pagan -OLS 6.87
[0.4416]
Ramsey-RESET - OLS 1.83 0.59 0.99
[0.1439] [0.6225] [0.4009]
swilk -OLS 4.99 4.67 3.35
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0004] 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses, and p-values in square brackets; All 
regression coefficients are significant at 0.05, unless otherwise stated; *: Significant 
at 0.1; ** Statistically insignificant; Efficiency Scores dataset 1995–2000; 
Assumptions: Score 1: CRTS, No weights, Input-Oriented, Convex Technology 
Capital Input corrected by utilization rates; Score 2: Non-DRTS, No weights, Input 
Oriented, Convex Technology Capital Input corrected by utilization rates. 
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The reading of those results is as follows. First, the equations exhibit high quality of fit 
reported by the R
2 of the OLS regressions.
44 In particular, the overall effect of the plant 
characteristics, ownership structure, and regulatory policy dummy explain 90% of the efficiency 
scores once capital input is adjusted by capacity utilization, and explains 78% when the 
assumption of constant returns to scale is relaxed.  Second, dummy variables for technology are 
robust and statistically significant in all equations. This implies that new gas-based technologies 
improve system efficiency, since they save on fuel consumption. Entrants played a central role in 
this particular issue. Third, the load factor is positively related, meaning that there is an effective 
reduction in the power losses associated with the frequent and costly plant start-ups. However, 
the square of the variable is negatively related, showing that there are decreasing returns to scale 
at full plant capacity.  
Fourth, plant age is negatively related, meaning that older plants lose relative efficiency. 
Nonetheless, there are positive learning effects that partially offset plant aging, given the 
behavior of the square of the age variable. For instance, the accumulated efficiency loss after 10 
years is 17%, but the learning effect represents a 4.5% efficiency gain. Fifth, regulatory policy 
has had positive effects. The regression coefficients indicate an overall efficiency gain of 2.7%. 
Sixth, the exercise is not conclusive regarding if there are structural differences in productive 
efficiency due to ownership. The private ownership dummy turned out not to be significant once 
capital input was corrected for capacity utilization and the assumption of constant returns to scale 
was relaxed (Equation 3). This result is in line with other studies. The study of Pollit (1995) 
reports statistically insignificant regression coefficients for his ownership dummy. Those 
regressions are based on a cross-sectional dataset of 768 thermal power plants for 14 countries. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has given an overview of the privatization program in Colombia gathering detailed 
information in a comprehensive way that puts this process in context within the global economic 
deregulation and market promotion competition strategy. In that sense, the paper offers for the 
first time a complete description of the privatization experience of the 1990s, and is also the first 
to provide empirical evidence based on an ex-post performance evaluation for the privatized 
                                                      
44 In general, the variables included in the Tobit regressions are robust. Residuals are homoskedastic according to the 
reported OLS tests. The residuals are not normal, which is associated with the distribution Kurtosis. The distribution 
of the residuals is symmetric.   
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plants. The paper has explored in-depth the cases of IFI manufacturing enterprises and power 
plants. These sectors account for 95% of the privatization sales, which undoubtedly make the 
results comprehensive in terms of the overall effects of privatization on firm performance.    
  The study yielded several interesting results. First, IFI firms followed the cycles and trends 
of their private competitors across the manufacturing industry. This was proved through the 
study’s measurement of 25 indicators of economic performance. The productivity slowdown of 
the 1980s hit these enterprises harder because they are among the largest capital-intensive plants. 
During the 1990s these firms underwent a severe restructuring process. The large increase in 
labor productivity and the adjustment in plant size led to a modest recovery of total factor 
productivity of the plants. The evolution of firm market power and profitability rates indicates 
that firms are pricing more competitively and still adjusting to global economic deregulation and 
foreign competition.  
This study has unbiased measurements because the sample includes firms in which IFI 
equity was entirely transferred to the private sector, liquidated firms and enterprises in which IFI 
is still a strategic shareholder. Privatization was important as a complementary mechanism that 
facilitated and sped up plant industrial restructuring. This observation is supported in 
econometric results in which the privatization dummy turned out to be a robust determinant for 
markup coefficients and the Translog indices of total factor productivity.  
The analysis of the power sector also yielded important results. The general trends of 
electricity contract prices, the evolution of plant entry in thermal generation, and the increasing 
share of non-regulated users in commercial demand suggest that the regulatory reform has been 
effective in promoting market competition and system efficiency. The performance analysis 
shows that the privatized holdings gained productive efficiency due to competition in power 
generation and the reduction of the non-technical power losses in distribution.  The measurement 
of efficiency scores by thermal units reinforces the evidence in favor of the existence of an 
overall gain in system efficiency and reliability. Regulatory policy has had positive effects on 
plant efficiency. The increasing number of non-regulated users has led generators to offer more 
competitive prices in order to ensure generation on contract bases. Lastly, the relation between 
ownership and efficiency is not conclusive for thermal generation once the assumption of 
constant returns to scale technology is relaxed and capital input is adjusted by capacity 
utilization. This result is in accordance with the findings of international studies on performance 
and ownership in electric utilities. 
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Appendix 1 
Infrastructure Concession Projects with Ongoing Private Investment by 1998 
 
Project Name Ownership Project Name Ownership
I. Roads Km III. Water and Sanitation
Armenia-Pereira-Manizale 98 Public-Concession ACUACAR-Cartagena Mixed-Capital
Barranquilla-Cienaga 60 Public-Concession
Bogota-Facatativa 41 Public-Concession Triple A-Bquilla Public-Concession
Bogota-Villavicencio 120 Public-Concession
Buga-Tulua-Paila 120 Public-Concession Sta Marta
Carreteras Meta 238 Public-Concession Metro-Agua Public-Concession
Cartagena-Barranquilla 112 Public-Concession
Cortijo-Vino 31 Public-Concession TIBITOC Plant for Public-Concession
Espinal Neiva 150 Public-Concession water treatment
Medellin-RioNegro 195 Public-Concession Bogota Water Company
Patios-Guasca 53 Public-Concession
Sta-Marta Paraguanchon 170 Public-Concession IV. Railroads KMs
Atlantic Line - cargo 965 Mixed-Capital
Total 1388
II. Gas-Pipelines Km V. Maritime Ports Number
Contracts Public-Concession
Sebastopol-Medellin 149 Public-Concession 15  and Private
Barranca-B/manga 59 Public-Concession VI. Telecommunications
Sur - Huila 193 Private
Mariquita-Cali 340 Private Mobile Phones Companies
Huila- Tolima 120 Private COMCEL Mixed
CELCARIBE Mixed
Total 861 OCCEL Mixed
CELUMOVIL Private
III. Airports CELUMOVIL COSTA Private
COCELCO Private
Bogota - Second runway 1 Public-Concession
Barranquilla - Aereopuerto 1 Public-Concession
del Caribe S.A
Cartagena-Airport 1 Public-Concession  
Sources: Alonso et al. (2001); Bonilla et al. (2000); CONPES documents: 2648 (DNP, 1993b); 2775 (DNP, 1995); 2928 (DNP, 
1997b) Law 37 of 1993. 
Notes: Excludes power sector. Concession contracts are either Build Operate Maintain Transfer (BOMT) or Rehabilitate Operate 
Maintain Transfer (ROMT). 
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Appendix 2  
 
List of IFI Enterprises in the Sample 
 
Num Name Startup ISIC4 ISIC Classification
1 ACERIAS PAZ DEL RIO 1947 3710 Basic iron and steel industries
2 AICSA 1977 3845 Manufacture of aircraft
3 ALCALIS - BETANIA 1951 3511 Basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers
4 ALCALIS-MAMONAL 1967 3511 Basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers
5 ASTIVAR 1974 3841 Ship building and repairing
6 CATSA 1978 3116 Grain mill products
7 CCA 1974 3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles
8 CEMENTOS BOYACA 1955 3523 Cement, lime and plaster
9 CEMENTOS RIOCLARO 1986 3692 Cement, lime and plaster
10 CERRO MATOSO 1979 3722 Mining and smelting of tin and nickel
11 COLCLINKER 1974 3692 Cement, lime and plaster
12 CONASTIL 1969 3841 Ship building and repairing
13 EMPAQUES DEL CAUCA S A 1965 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
14 FATEXTOL 1988 3220 Apparel
15 FEDERALTEX SA 1987 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
16 FERTICOL 1966 3511 Fertilizers and pesticides
17 FRIGOPESCA SA 1978 3114 Canning, processing of fish, crustaceans
18 ICOLLANTAS 1942 3551 Tire and tube industries
19 INGENIO RISARALDA 1978 3118 Sugar, factories and refineries
20 INTELSA SA 1979 3832 Manufacture of radio, tv, and telecom eq.
21 MONOMEROS SA 1967 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides
22 PENWALT 1967 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides
23 PROPAL 1961 3411 Pulp, paper and paperboard
24 QUIBI 1968 3522 Manufacture of drugs and medicines
25 SIMESA 1938 3710 Basic iron and steel industries
26 SOFASA 1969 3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles
27 SUCROMILES 1973 3511 Basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers
28 TEJIDOS UNICA 1953 3216 Weaving and cotton manufactures
29 TEXPINAL 1973 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
30 VIKINGOS DE COLOMBIA S A 1968 3114 Canning, processing of fish, crustaceans  
Source: DANE, Industrial Directory; IFI, Investment Department. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Performance Indicators: Definitions and Methodology 
The EAM is in practice a census of medium and large enterprises in manufacturing. The EAM has 
undergone three methodological changes affecting the following time periods, respectively: i) 1970–1991, 
ii) 1992–1993, and iii) 1994 to date. The changes have been addressed toward: i) the inclusion or 
exclusion of variables within chapters; ii) the addition or suppression of new information across chapters; 
iii) modification of the format or variable classification criteria; and iv) the rescaling of the sample 
cohorts.  
 
Some specific examples are the changes of the payroll classification, the inclusion of temporary workers 
after 1987, the exclusion of direct exports as a component of firm’s sales, the elimination of the direct tax 
variables after 1991, the redefinition of large enterprise according to number employees, and the addition 
of new components for fixed investment after 1992, among many others.  
 
Despite the format modifications, the survey has kept the basic variables and structure across time. The 
database clean up process was a two-step procedure. First, we worked with the basic variables of the 
1970-1991 survey. Second, all basic series were overlapped and grouped keeping the original definitions 
of the older survey.
45 The manufacturing survey offers five types of variables:  
 
1. Identification variables: Location (blue-park district), specific ISIC group, firm’s legal capital 
structure, and size classification. 
 
2.  Labor variables: Wages, benefits, permanent and temporary employees, administrative 
employees, workers, technicians, and gender statistics.  
 
3.  Output-related variables: Gross output, value added, intermediate consumption components, 
industrial expenditures, and inventories of final products and raw materials.  
 
4.  Finance-related variables: Fixed asset investment, accounting depreciation, sales, marketing 
spending, paid royalties, and other general expenditure variables. 
 
5. Consumption, generation, and sales of electricity.   
 
The survey recorded data for 133 variables from 1970 to 1991. The survey recorded 380 variables during 
1992 and 1993. From 1994 to date, the survey has worked with 200 variables. The 1992–1993 period is 
problematic because the survey included information that was not comparable with previous data. 
However, the core variables were recorded.  
                                                      
45 The main problem of the above methodological changes was the modification in the basic plant ID variable from 
1991 to 1992, and 1993. This is troublesome if one wants to track the information at plant level. We ran a cross 
matching program throughout plant commercial names, recorded at the industrial directories, and generated an 
identification key for the ID variables in the 1991–1992 and 1992–1993 surveys.  
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The Indicators 
 
The EAM database allows for measurement the following set of plant characteristics and performance 
indicators for each one of the IFI’s companies. 
 








0    Initial capital formula 
 
where: g: The historic growth rate of the fixed assets gross investment series; δ: Economic depreciation 
rate; IB0: Gross investment at initial date  
 
 
Having K0 , the capital stock series are generated using the perpetual inventory method: 
 
t t t I k k + − = − ) 1 ( 1 δ  
 
Depreciation rates are taken from Pombo (1999b). 
 











= partial labor productivity 1 
 






= partial labor productivity 2 
 
The TFP indices follow the measurement of Solow’s residual using a Translog technology specification, 
which allows for changes of inputs’ efficiency (Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967). 
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Aggregate inputs follow a Translog specification in their components. Thus, under CRTS the Translog 
index for capital, labor and intermediate materials is: 
 
) x ln x (ln ) S S (
X
X











− ⋅ − ⋅ = ∑                      
 
where: Sit represents the expenditure share of each component of input X observed at time t, and xit 
denotes the quantity of each component i in X at time T. 
 

























= firm size 2; where L = permanent employment 
 
where j denotes specific ISIC classification. 
 
 







= Quality in intermediate consumption 
 
where IRMC = Imported raw material; DRM = domestic raw materials 
 


































Advertising rate. This is an indicator of product differentiation, where Adv = advertising 














= Output-scale indicator; where Y-bar is the average output of ISIC group j. 
 












= Machinery and equipment investment rate 
  = Embodied investment rate  i i/I IME
 


















where the numerator stands for the four largest plants in ISIC group j.  
















= Export orientation coefficient ISIC group j 
 
15. 




− =1 = Grubel and Lloyd intraindustry trade index by ISIC group j.  
 












i L = Lerner index (price-cost margin) for firm i 
 
where αi = firm’s market share, and ε = the demand elasticity. Demand elasticities are taken from Pombo 
(1999b). 
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Appendix 4  
 
The Power Sector Datasets 
 
At present, the power sector statistics in Colombia are split among the following institutions:  
 
i) The National Grid Company (Interconexión Eléctrica S.A); ii) the Mining and Energy Planning Unit 
(UPME); iii) the Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG); iii) the National Planning 
Department (DNP); and iv) the Superintendent of Domiciliary Public Services (SSPD). As a result, each 
source has a different format and contents.  
 
The information is sorted out either by plant, utilities, regional electricity markets, regional geographical 
provinces, or simply at a countrywide aggregate level. The Table A4.1 describes the contents of the 
collected datasets. 
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Table A4.1. Colombia – Power Sector Statistics – Description of the Datasets 
 
DATA SOURCES  CONTENTS
ISA Reports Operative Reports of the National Interconnected System
(1995-1999)  - Hydrology
 - Grid Constraints
 - Generation
 - Demand
 - Available effective capacity
The Electricity Spot Market Report
- Pool's prices and contacts
- Total traded amount (GWh)
- Pool's marginal supply prices by type of generation
SIVICO The following data are available by utility level:
1997-1999
Financial Statements 
Source: SSPD - Income statement
- Balance sheet
Labor Statistics 
- Number of employees by sector's activity
- Number of employees by occupational category
- Number of employees by type of generation
Market Composition by Type of Users
- Consumption
- Invoicing
- Number of subscribers
- Average tariffs by users
Results and Performance Control Process Indicators
- Quality service indicators
- Spending and indebtedness indicators
SIEE The Energy and Economic Information System is a 
1970-1998 dataset covering the Latin American economies' energy-related
statistics.
Source: OLADE
The SIEE sections are:
- Prices
- Demand and supply
- Energy-related equipment
- Environmental impact
- Economic + energy indicators
 - World-wide energy statistics
FEN The power sector historical financial data compiled by the 
1983-1994 Financiera Electrica Nacional (FEN). The database offers




- Other variables: purchase + sales of bulk electricity;
  available capacity; power losses
SINSE The power sector national system is a comprehensive
1970-1994 database. The data are available by utility and regional market.
Source: MME The SINSE chapters are
- Energy balances
- Generation and electricity demand
- Number and type of subcribers
- Average tariffs by users  
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Besides the above datasets there were direct requests to ISA for the monthly indicators of the Mercado de 
Energia Mayorista (MEM) starting in July 1995, and the Thermal Park Dataset. The crossing of 
information among ISA’s thermal park dataset, SIVICO, and SINSE allowed us to collect the input-output 
variables by thermal unit that are depicted in Table A4.2.   
 
In order to make direct inferences of labor input by plant after 1996, a survey was carried out among the 
members of the Colombian Generators Association (ACOLGEN). The collected information allowed for 
distinguishing benchmarks of capacity-labor ratios, which under normal assumptions of putty-clay 
technology that coefficient to be turns out a constant parameter. The data provided by the power utilities 
along with SIVICO allowed us to identify the number of employees by thermal plants for the period 
1996–1999 given the reported capacity per unit.    
 
 












Labor (Number of employees)*
Heat Rate  
Sources: SINSE, ISA, SIVICO 
Notes: * Since 1996. Labor information is recorded by 
power utility and industry activity: generation, 
transmission and distribution (SIVICO). 
 
 
The estimated benchmark labor to capacity ratios by occupational category for a base-technology thermal 
plant were: 
0.036597 (Directives); 0.151852 (Administrative), and 0.527731(Operative) 
For the 1988–1994 period the FEN books recorded some physical variables per power utility, among them 
the permanent employment series. Thus, the inference of labor series by the thermal units followed a 
constant distributing capacity assumption, that is: 
Thermal Unit Labor (L1) = (Max Theoretical Thermal Plant Unit Capacity (GWh) / Utility Available 
Capacity (GWh)) * Total Permanent Utility Employees 
Other formulas were used in order to generate alternative labor series by thermal plants. One was based on 
power generation: 
Thermal Unit Labor (L2) = (Thermal Plant Generation (GWh) / Utility Available Capacity in GWh) * 
Total Permanent Utility Employees 
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Then an adjusted L2 series was generated under the assumption:  











avg x = ; and  
Rationing Price: MgPhydro > MgPthermal = 1.8;  
Without Rationing: MgPhydro < MgPthermal = 0.6 
The above coefficients are observed parameters. L1 and L2 were used as the labor input series in the 
estimation of plant efficiency scores.    
 
 